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THE STRUGGLE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LEGITIMACY 
TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940.  By Daniel R. Ernst.  New York: 
Oxford University Press.  2014.  Pp. 240.  $39.95. 
Reviewed by Jeremy K. Kessler 
INTRODUCTION 
Nearly forty years ago, Professor James O. Freedman described the 
American administrative state as haunted by a “recurrent sense of cri-
sis.”1  “Each generation has tended to define the crisis in its own 
terms,”2 and “each generation has fashioned solutions responsive to the 
problems it has perceived.”3  Yet “a strong and persisting challenge to 
the basic legitimacy of the administrative process” always returns, in a 
new guise, to trouble the next generation.4  On this account, the Amer-
ican people remain perennially unconvinced that administrative 
decisionmaking is “appropriate, proper, and just,”5 entitled to respect 
and obedience “by virtue of who made the decision” (executive offi-
cials) and “how it was made” (the administrative process).6 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  For their forceful readings of earlier 
versions of the manuscript, I owe a great debt to Willy Forbath, Dave Pozen, and Rob Cobbs.  
For conversation and inspiration along the way, I thank Grey Anderson, Kate Andrias, Jessica 
Bulman-Pozen, Stefan Eich, Ted Fertik, Kat Forrester, Risa Goluboff, Jamal Greene, Joanna 
Grisinger, Bernard Harcourt, Olati Johnson, Laura Kalman, Ira Katznelson, Sophia Lee, Gillian 
Metzger, Henry Monaghan, Bill Novak, Sophie Pinkham, Noah Rosenblum, Reuel Schiller, Mira 
Siegelberg, Karen Tani, and Adam Tooze.  Mickey DiBattista provided essential research assis-
tance and reality testing, while the Harvard Law Review staff thoughtfully and faithfully shep-
herded this errant piece to publication.  I do not know what Bo Burt would have thought about 
the whole, but every part is stamped with his insistence that law is conflict, and conflict is ines-
capable.  This Review is dedicated to Bo, whose memory is indeed a blessing.  
 1 JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 11 (1978). 
 2 Id. at 7. 
 3 Id. at 9. 
 4 Id. at 10.  
 5 Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 375, 376 (2006). 
 6 Id. at 377.  Unless otherwise noted, this Review assumes a minimal empirical definition of 
legitimacy, one that derives from the sociological and psychological literature: an institution is le-
gitimate when people believe that institution to be “appropriate, proper, and just,” and by reason 
of that belief feel “obligated to defer” to its decisions.  Id. at 376; cf. 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY 
AND SOCIETY 214 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Bedmin-
ster Press 1968) (1922) (“[T]he legitimacy of a system of domination may be treated sociologically 
only as the probability that to a relevant degree the appropriate attitudes [toward the system] will 
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Freedman also argued that this legitimacy deficit was unwarranted: 
he characterized the American administrative state as a product of 
gradual evolution, with roots in the earliest days of the republic and a 
long track record of substantial political accountability, relatively effec-
tive implementation of statutory mandates, and more or less fair pro-
cedures.7  Such a gradualist account of American administrative histo-
ry was eccentric in the late 1970s, when Freedman wrote his prescient 
study, Crisis and Legitimacy.  In the past two decades, however, legal 
scholars and social scientists have significantly bolstered the gradualist 
narrative, redescribing the formation of the American administrative 
state as a centuries-long process of doctrinal development, intellectual 
adjustment, and political bargaining rather than a constitutional rup-
ture caused by sudden political realignment, emergency rule, or the 
wholesale adoption of foreign practices and ideologies.8  Professor 
Daniel Ernst’s intellectual inventiveness, exquisite archival work, and 
lucid prose have long inspired and guided this project.9  In Tocque-
ville’s Nightmare, Ernst delivers a pathbreaking account of how politi-
cally moderate, early twentieth-century lawyers first confronted, then 
transformed, and finally secured the legitimacy of the administrative 
state.  The book is a canonical contribution to the scholarly effort to 
normalize American administrative government. 
Yet the felt need for such normalizing history recalls the overarch-
ing thesis of Crisis and Legitimacy: however “normal” the administra-
tive state may (in truth) be, the American people’s “uneasiness” about 
its legitimacy persists.10  The recent proliferation of scholarly defenses 
of the historical pedigree of the administrative state is a testament to 
the distinctively historical cast of our present generation’s “uneasiness.”  
Tocqueville’s Nightmare seeks both to diagnose and to alleviate this 
contemporary historical discomfort.  
The book, Ernst explains, “answers a complaint that has gained in 
popularity since the eruption of the Tea Party movement in 2009,” the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
exist, and the corresponding practical conduct [obedience to the system] ensue.”).  For the poten-
tial limits of such a purely empirical definition of legitimacy, see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITI-
MATION CRISIS 95–102 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1975) (1973); and Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1789–92, 1848-50 (2005). 
 7 FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 4, 11, 125–26, 259–64. 
 8 See sources cited infra notes 45–49. 
 9 See, e.g., Daniel R. Ernst & Victor Jew, Introduction, in TOTAL WAR AND THE LAW 1 
(Daniel R. Ernst & Victor Jew eds., 2002); Daniel R. Ernst, Law and the State, 1920–2000: Institu-
tional Growth and Structural Change, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 1 
(Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008); Daniel R. Ernst, Dicey’s Disciple on the 
D.C. Circuit: Judge Harold Stephens and Administrative Law Reform, 1933–1940, 90 GEO. L.J. 
787 (2002); Daniel R. Ernst, Common Laborers? Industrial Pluralists, Legal Realists, and the Law 
of Industrial Disputes, 1915–1943, 11 LAW & HIST. REV. 59 (1993); Daniel R. Ernst, Willard 
Hurst and the Administrative State: From Williams to Wisconsin, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (2000). 
 10 FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 9, 11. 
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complaint that “the statebuilders of the early twentieth century aban-
doned an American tradition of individualism in what amounted to 
‘the decisive wrong turn in the nation’s history’” (p. 7).11  Ernst re-
sponds that the early twentieth-century “reformers who supposedly 
sent the Constitution into exile[] actually designed the principles of in-
dividual rights, limited government, and due process” — principles 
that had guided the nation since its founding — “into the administra-
tive state” itself (pp. 7–8).  These reformers did so in large part by en-
suring that lawyers would remain an integral part of the administra-
tive process.  Whenever the classical, court-centered “rule of law” 
proved simply unworkable, the “rule of lawyers” would fill the gap: 
“an adverse but not implacably hostile bar” working both inside and 
outside the state apparatus to ensure that administrative 
decisionmaking was fair in application and limited in scope (p. 7). 
Ernst is not alone in perceiving an uptick in historically grounded 
“complaint” against administrative government — and in responding 
with historically grounded counterarguments.  In a recent article, Pro-
fessors Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule warn that “[i]n the past 
several years” a form of “libertarian administrative law” has arisen in 
the federal judiciary, the goal of which is “to compensate for perceived 
departures during the New Deal from the baseline of the original con-
stitutional order” by applying “a kind of strict scrutiny to agency deci-
sions.”12  Sunstein and Vermeule’s focus is on the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and they note that, even there, a mitigation of the libertarian 
tendency may be underway.13  Yet Sunstein and Vermeule worry that 
historically inflected libertarian attacks on the administrative state will 
continue unless the Supreme Court “excise[s] libertarian administrative 
law root and branch” from our constitutional culture.14 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 11 The author quotes Tony Badger, The Lessons of the New Deal: Did Obama Learn the Right 
Ones?, 97 HIST. 99, 103 (2012). 
 12 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 
398–400 (2015).  Others have similarly detected an ideological and doctrinal shift in the courts.  See, 
e.g., Patrick M. Garry, Judicial Review and the “Hard Look” Doctrine, 7 NEV. L.J. 151, 152 (2006) 
(“[A] creeping escalation of judicial scrutiny of agency behavior appears to be taking place.”). 
 13 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 470–71 (discussing Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., 706 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc)). 
 14 Id. at 401.  The 2014–2015 Term suggests that the Supreme Court is very much on the fence 
about whether or not to do so.  On the one hand, the Court reversed two D.C. Circuit opinions, 
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 
S. Ct. 1225 (2015), that Sunstein and Vermeule identify as epitomizing libertarian administrative 
law.  See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 419–23, 429–34.  On the other hand, these rever-
sals were accompanied by textbook “libertarian administrative law” minority opinions from Justic-
es Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.  See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1211–13 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); id. at 1213–25 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1210–11 (Alito, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment); Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. at 1240–55 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment); id. at 1234–40 (Alito, J., concurring).  These reversals were also fol-
lowed by a puzzling set of decisions in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy upheld 
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Ernst’s book and Sunstein and Vermeule’s article, Libertarian Ad-
ministrative Law, both trace contemporary doubts about administrative 
legitimacy to the ideology of the “Constitution in Exile.”15  The term 
was coined in 1995 by D.C. Circuit Judge Douglas Ginsburg,16 a 
Reagan appointee, and for the past twenty years it has loomed in the 
background of conservative critiques of constitutional and administra-
tive law doctrines associated with the New Deal and civil rights revolu-
tions.17  As described by Sunstein and Vermeule, the ideology of the 
“Constitution in Exile” is a mélange of libertarianism and originalism, 
one that seeks to restore a putatively lost legal regime defined by “sharp 
limits on national power” and “unenumerated rights of liberty, property, 
and contract that go beyond existing judicial understandings.”18 
What any particular exile finds illegitimate about administrative 
government will depend on which form of argument, libertarian or 
originalist, she emphasizes.  According to Justice Clarence Thomas 
and Professor Philip Hamburger, for instance, the very existence of the 
modern administrative state is illegitimate because it departs from 
Founding-era conceptions of good government, which include a highly 
formalistic separation of powers and rigorous procedural protections 
for regulated parties.19  This view, grounded in historical argument 
and inflected with an originalist account of legitimation,20 is distinct in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
complex administrative schemes while casting significant doubt on the Court’s tradition of defer-
ence to agency statutory interpretation.  See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (declin-
ing to apply Chevron to “a question of deep ‘economic and political significance’” (quoting Util. 
Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014))); Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. 
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513–26 (2015) (declining to  
address Chevron); see also Seth Davis, Chevron’s Magical Disappearing Act?, PRAWFSBLAWG  
(June 26, 2015, 2:38 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/06/chevrons-magical 
-disappearing-act.html [http://perma.cc/7VHK-UQAW]; Chris Walker, What King v. Burwell 
Means for Administrative Law, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 25, 2015),  
http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/what-king-v-burwell-means-for-administrative-law-by-chris-walker 
[http://perma.cc/JCG5-H8BV]; Adam Zimmerman, Chevron After King v. Burwell, PRAWFS-
BLAWG (June 25, 2015, 6:00 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/06/chevron 
-after-king-v-burwell.html [http://perma.cc/8FL4-PY3A]. 
 15 Both the author in his book reviewed here (pp. 8 & 161 n.30), and Sunstein and Vermeule in 
their article, cite to Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 18 REG., no. 1, 1995, at 83, 
83–84 (reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993)).  See 
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 401. 
 16 Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 84. 
 17 See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004); 
DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER (2011); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE 
CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION (2014); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014); DAVID N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT (2011). 
 18 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 402. 
 19 See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1215–25 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); HAMBURGER, 
supra note 17, at 3–5, 111, 227, 324. 
 20 To the extent that “we [or most of us] are all originalists now,” talk of an originalist account 
of legitimation will not be very helpful.  See Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in 
ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM 1 (2011).  
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theory if not always in practice from a more directly libertarian ap-
proach.  The latter faults the administrative state more for the present-
day burdens it places on economic liberty and the smooth functioning 
of markets than its lack of antique authorization.21  Yet even primarily 
libertarian critics tend to fall back on originalist or quasi-originalist 
arguments when it comes to explaining why their economic views 
should have legally binding force.22 
Given the originalist spirit of these contemporary critiques of the 
administrative process, it is perhaps unsurprising that its defenders 
have responded with history, not economic theory.  Yet while this 
choice is natural for a legal historian like Ernst, it is notable how 
many administrative law theorists have also turned to history.23  
Sunstein and Vermeule are prime examples, taking a strongly histori-
cist tack in their effort to dispel the shadow cast by the “Constitution 
in Exile.”  Today’s libertarian administrative law, Sunstein and 
Vermeule contend, represents a repudiation of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act24 (APA), which was not just any statute.  Relying heavily 
on the historical gloss offered by then-Justice Rehnquist in Vermont 
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.,25 Sunstein and Vermeule argue that the APA’s passage marked a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
But see James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1785 
(2013).  This Review uses the term “originalism” to refer to those more restrictive originalist vari-
ants that would interpret Founding-era conceptions of separation of powers and due process  
to preclude significant portions of contemporary administrative practice and administrative law  
doctrine. 
 21 See EPSTEIN, supra note 17, at 40 (“[T]he entrenched administrative state, especially on 
issues of fair competition and price stability, causes real economic loss and social disloca-
tion . . . .”); Trevor W. Morrison, Lamenting Lochner’s Loss: Randy Barnett’s Case for a Libertari-
an Constitution, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 839, 844–45 (2005) (reviewing BARNETT, supra note 17) 
(arguing that Professor Randy Barnett’s “account of constitutional legitimacy . . . has very little to 
do with the Framers’ actual views of constitutional formation,” which grounded constitutional 
legitimacy in “popular sovereignty” as opposed to Barnett’s “presumption of liberty”); cf.  
HAMBURGER, supra note 17, at 2 (“[W]hen this book objects to . . . exercises of binding [adminis-
trative] power, it does not ordinarily question the policies thereby pursued by the government.  
Nor does it question the policies pursued by the government in its exercise of nonbinding power, 
such as its distribution of welfare, social security, or other benefits.”). 
 22 See Morrison, supra note 21, at 848 (explaining that while Barnett begins with a “libertarian 
theory of constitutional legitimacy,” he believes that public-meaning originalism is the “method of 
constitutional interpretation . . . most consistent with that theory”); Suzanna Sherry, Property Is 
the New Privacy: The Coming Constitutional Revolution, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1452, 1453 (2015) 
(reviewing EPSTEIN, supra note 17) (noting that “Epstein’s constitution . . . is constructed from 
substantive moral values,” but that “Epstein’s moral values are those on which he believes the 
Founders based their constitution”). 
 23 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 
(2010); JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION (2012); Gillian 
E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1929 (2013). 
 24 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C.). 
 25 435 U.S. 519, 523 (1978). 
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constitutionally momentous settlement of the legitimacy crisis that 
shook the American administrative state in the first four decades of 
the twentieth century, a crisis that culminated in the New Deal.26  Af-
ter years of struggle, Sunstein and Vermeule explain, pro– and anti–
New Deal forces were able to reach a political compromise by agreeing 
on the depoliticization of administrative law: “the APA should be 
treated as an organizing charter for the administrative state — a  
super-statute, if you will — not because it is a grand statement of prin-
ciples with a specific ideological valence, but precisely because it is a 
compromise document,”27 one that signifies that “the master 
metaprinciple of administrative law is that it has no single theoretical 
master principle, at least not with any kind of ideological valence.”28  
The APA, in other words, is a constitutionally authoritative declara-
tion that “administrative law lacks any kind of ideological valence.”29  
And on this absence of ideology, its legitimacy depends.  Otherwise, we 
may assume, the administrative process will remain wracked by 
Freedman’s “recurrent sense of crisis,”30 as one political bloc — pro-
gressive or libertarian, left or right — repudiates that process as a ve-
hicle for the other bloc’s ideological goals.31 
While their responses to the “Constitution in Exile” movement di-
verge in several important respects,32 Tocqueville’s Nightmare and  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 26 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 466. 
 27 Id. (footnote omitted). 
 28 Id. at 471.  For the constitutional theory of superstatutes and its implications for adminis-
trative law, see generally ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 23; Kathryn E. Kovacs, 
Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1207 (2015). 
 29 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 401–02. 
 30 FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 6–12. 
 31 Cf. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 471 (“Administrative law enjoys a partial auton-
omy from both quotidian politics and political theories, in the modest but important sense that no 
political view or theory can properly claim to have captured the whole terrain or to describe all 
the rules.”). 
 32 While Sunstein and Vermeule ground the legitimacy of administrative law in a political  
consensus on its depoliticization, Ernst emphasizes the importance of lawyerly — rather than po-
litical — decisionmaking in the legitimation of administrative government.  Thus, while Sunstein 
and Vermeule trace the legitimacy of their depoliticized administrative law to the constitutionally 
significant political bargain that the APA represents, Ernst views the APA mainly as a “codifica-
tion” of the earlier “entente” between courts and agencies that the legal profession had brokered 
by 1940 (pp. 7, 137).  The difference grows starker when one considers the argument, put forward 
elsewhere by Vermeule, that administrative decisionmaking (rather than administrative law as it 
operates in the courts) gains its legitimacy from presidential politics, not from depoliticized legal 
rules.  ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND 4–5 (2010).  In-
deed, in his own review of Tocqueville’s Nightmare, Vermeule argues that Ernst’s story of lawyerly 
administration has largely been sidelined by the shift from adjudication to rulemaking as the 
dominant mode of administrative governance.  Adrian Vermeule, Portrait of an Equilibrium, 
NEW RAMBLER, http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/tocqueville-s-nightmare [http:// 
perma.cc/T2BC-SM47].  The relationship between Ernst’s lawyerly account of administrative 
legitimacy and Vermeule’s political conception is discussed below.  See infra section III.A, 
pp. 759–61.  
  
724 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 129:718 
Libertarian Administrative Law pursue strikingly similar argumenta-
tive strategies.  First, both works present the history of administrative 
law as an effective normative response to the challenge posed by the 
“Constitution in Exile” movement.  Second, they both argue that this 
history reveals that the administrative process won its legitimacy by the 
end of the New Deal.  Third, they both contend that this legitimacy 
stemmed from a consensus — whether in the form of a lawyerly “en-
tente” between courts and agencies (Ernst) or a politically brokered  
“super-statute” (Sunstein and Vermeule) — that the administrative pro-
cess should be governed by a set of politically impartial legal principles. 
In regard to this last point of agreement, it is telling that the win-
ners of Ernst’s history are not the hardened legal realists whom we 
generally think of as building, and justifying, the New Deal state.   
Rather, Ernst turns the spotlight on reform-minded corporate lawyers, 
such as Charles Evans Hughes and John Lord O’Brian, who stepped 
back from the edge of realism.  While accepting the necessity of the 
administrative state for managing a modern economy, they fought to 
imbue that state with a legalistic conception of “fair play” and a dis-
tinctively lawyerly form of expertise.  These political and intellectual 
moderates would have agreed with Sunstein and Vermeule when they 
write that “[a] dose of legal realism . . . has its place, but . . . respect 
for the governing rules is not optional.”33  Just as for Sunstein and 
Vermeule, the APA evacuated administrative law of “any kind of ideo-
logical valence,”34 for Ernst, the “rule of lawyers” insulated the admin-
istrative state from becoming a weapon in the hands of any particular 
social or economic group.35 
It apparently goes without saying — neither Ernst nor his protago-
nists say it — that the impartiality of the “rule of lawyers” admits one 
important exception.  Under a “rule of lawyers,” the administrative 
state will persistently favor one socioeconomic bloc: lawyers and the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 33 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 473. 
 34 Id. at 401–02. 
 35 While Ernst recognizes that “particular political, professional, or scholarly interest[s]” have, 
on occasion, bent administrative law to their own ends, he suggests that by retaining “their long-
standing role as mediators between state and society,” lawyers have successfully imbued the ad-
ministrative state with the “fundamental principles of American government” (pp. 143–44).  These 
“fundamental principles,” according to Ernst, are exemplified by Hughes’s and O’Brian’s empha-
sis on fairness toward all regulated parties, regardless of social or economic background (pp. 72–
74, 97–106).  Indeed, the pivotal moment in the history of the administrative state appears to be 
Hughes’s prevention of “commission government from evolving into socialism and corporatism” 
(p. 144).  In the wake of this defense of the administrative state from total capture by either labor 
or capital, lawyers followed Hughes’s lead, “accept[ing] a new role of holding America’s ‘central-
ized administration’ to the social rationality they knew of as law” (p. 138) (citing Daniel R. Ernst, 
The Ideal and the Actual in the State: Willard Hurst at the Board of Economic Warfare, in TO-
TAL WAR AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at 150, 170). 
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interests they serve.36  From this perspective, Tocqueville’s Nightmare 
can be read as a narrative of regulatory capture: the capture of the 
administrative state by lawyers themselves.  But while regulatory cap-
ture is generally understood as a threat to administrative legitimacy,37 
Ernst suggests that lawyerly capture is its condition precedent.  If he is 
right, important new questions come to the fore: how did lawyers win 
the struggle to equate administrative legitimacy with their control of 
the administrative state, and what exactly did they win by defining 
administrative legitimacy in this way?  Ernst’s ingenious history not 
only forces us to ask these questions, but also helps us answer them. 
The remainder of this Review is organized as follows.  Part I dis-
cusses the book’s substantive and methodological contributions to the 
legal history of the American administrative state.  Part II gives a 
fuller description of its narrative structure, cast of characters, and ar-
gumentative turns.  Part III addresses two sets of objections to Ernst’s 
account.  One set of objections relates to the relevance of Tocqueville’s 
Nightmare to contemporary critiques of administrative legitimacy.  
First, to the extent that these critiques object to the administrative 
state on originalist or quasi-originalist grounds, an account of the way 
in which old constitutional principles were adopted and adapted by a 
new administrative bar may well be a non sequitur.  Second, to the ex-
tent that these critiques construe the contemporary administrative 
state as a primarily political body characterized by presidential control 
and partisan, quasi-legislative rulemaking, Ernst’s history of the “rule 
of lawyers” may read like ancient history — the record of an era of 
administrative governance that has long since passed. 
Another set of objections assumes the relevance of Tocqueville’s 
Nightmare but questions its persuasiveness as an account of the ad-
ministrative state’s legitimacy.  First, to the extent that Ernst’s argu-
ment for administrative legitimacy depends on his historical claim 
that, by 1940, there was a “consensus” on lawyerly administration (p. 
125), one might question who exactly consented to this particularly le-
galistic mode of administrative governance.  In order to highlight the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 36 Cf. William E. Forbath, Courting the State: An Essay for Morton Horwitz, in 2 TRANS-
FORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 70, 77–79 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. 
Brophy eds., 2010) [hereinafter Forbath, Courting the State] (calling for a sociopolitical analysis of 
the continuing dominance of lawyers and legalism in the development of the American state);  
William E. Forbath, Politics, State-Building, and the Courts, 1870–1920, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE 
HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 9, at 643, 695 [hereinafter Forbath, Politics] (de-
scribing the legal profession’s efforts to maintain its socioeconomic power at the turn of the twen-
tieth century). 
 37 See, e.g., Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, Introduction, in PREVENTING REGULATO-
RY CAPTURE 2, 2 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014) (arguing that the “widespread 
belief that special interests capture regulation, and that neither the government nor the public can 
prevent this, understandably weakens public trust in government”). 
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deft maneuvers of reformist Wall Street lawyers like Hughes and 
O’Brian, Ernst’s narrative downplays other contenders — most signif-
icantly, antilegalistic and prolabor New Dealers, for whom the ostensi-
bly moderate “rule of lawyers” resembled the rule of antilabor con-
servatives.  The victory of Ernst’s moderate protagonists may be 
attributable less to the popularity, or soundness, of their vision, than to 
a stalemate between more full-throated prolabor and antilabor forces.  
Second, assuming that there was, in some sense, a consensus on the 
rule of lawyers around 1940, one might question the extent to which 
this consensus actually helped to legitimize the administrative state 
thereafter.  Ernst does not consider the possibility that the moderate 
vision of lawyerly administration has been a source of — rather than a 
guard against — the “recurrent sense of crisis”38 that has harried the 
administrative state since 1940.  Yet his protagonists’ belief that the 
administrative state required legal guardianship may well be the pre-
cursor — rather than the antidote — to today’s libertarian and 
originalist challenges to administrative legitimacy. 
I.  THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 
The past twenty years have witnessed a revolution in the historical 
study of the American administrative state, both inside and outside the 
legal academy.  Toppled are two previously dominant “sovereign nar-
ratives.”39  The first narrative placed the emergence of the modern 
administrative state in the late nineteenth century, a time of political 
and economic upheaval that led to the professionalization of the gov-
ernment bureaucracy, both at the state and federal levels, and the rise 
of the independent regulatory commissions.40  Before this time, the sto-
ry went, the American federal government had been a fragmentary 
“state of courts and parties,”41 lacking the sort of centralized, profes-
sionalized national bureaucracy that, during the nineteenth century, 
had come to typify European — and properly modern — govern-
ment.42  The second narrative, while not denying the importance of 
turn-of-the-century reforms, associated the true emergence of the mod-
ern administrative state with the New Deal, a second period of politi-
cal and economic upheaval.  This period saw an explosion in the size 
and scope of the federal government; a proliferation of new agencies 
and commissions; and a legal crisis over the relative independence of 
administrative decisionmaking from judicial and, at times, legislative 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 38 FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 6. 
 39 See DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 7 (2001). 
 40 Id. at 8–9. 
 41 STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE 25 (1982). 
 42 See id. at 24–26. 
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control.43  This crisis was resolved, the story went, sometime between 
President Roosevelt’s massive reelection victory in 1936 — precipitat-
ing the legendary “switch in time” — and 1946, when Congress passed 
and President Truman signed into law the APA, a statutory settlement 
of the conflict between agencies and courts.44 
These two narratives — one emphasizing the roots of modern ad-
ministrative governance, the other emphasizing its full flowering — 
have been successfully attacked on two broad fronts.  First, a growing 
body of scholarship has traced the roots of modern administrative gov-
ernance back to the early American republic and even to colonial prac-
tices.45  From this perspective, both of the previous sovereign narra-
tives begin far too late, suffering from a widely held belief in the early 
American state’s “exceptional,” “weak” character in comparison to Eu-
ropean nation-states.46  Meanwhile, a second body of scholarship has 
focused on the gap between the two sovereign narratives, constructing 
a story of gradual development between turn-of-the-century institu-
tions and ideologies and the midcentury administrative state that 
achieved international hegemony, even as it remained pockmarked by 
internal weaknesses and contradictions.47  The constitutional history of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 43 See CARPENTER, supra note 39, at 7; see also G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION 
AND THE NEW DEAL 13–14 (2000). 
 44 See WHITE, supra note 43, at 13–14, 94–95. 
 45 See, e.g., BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT (2009); MICHELE LANDIS 
DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE (2013); MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF 
GOVERNMENT (2003); MASHAW, supra note 23; REBECCA M. MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF 
IMPRISONMENT (2008); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE (1996); NICHOLAS R. 
PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE (2013); Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian 
Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012 (2015); Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The 
Post Office and the Birth of Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553 (2007); Sarah 
Barringer Gordon, The First Disestablishment: Limits on Church Power and Property Before the 
Civil War, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 307 (2014); Richard R. John, Governmental Institutions as Agents of 
Change: Rethinking American Political Development in the Early Republic, 1787–1835, 11 STUD. 
AM. POL. DEV. 347 (1997); Gautham Rao, Administering Entitlement: Governance, Public Health 
Care, and the Early American State, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 627 (2012). 
 46 William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 752, 754 
(2008). 
 47 See, e.g., MARGOT CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE (2009); CHRISTOPHER 
CAPOZZOLA, UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU (2008); GARY GERSTLE, AMERICAN CRUCIBLE 
(2001); COLIN GORDON, NEW DEALS (1994); KIMBERLEY S. JOHNSON, GOVERNING THE 
AMERICAN STATE (2007); KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES (2004); 
JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS (2003); AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE 
MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE (2013); MICHAEL WILLRICH, POX (2011); JOHN FABIAN 
WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC (2004); Ernst, Law and the State, 1920–2000: Institutional 
Growth and Structural Change, supra note 9, at 1; Forbath, Politics, supra note 36; Jeremy K. 
Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 
(2014); Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative 
State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2006); Reuel E. Schiller, 
Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the Modern First 
Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1 (2000); Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, 
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the New Deal, which has experienced an astonishing renaissance in the 
past two decades, is one facet of this second revisionist project.48  In 
this second category can also be placed work that questions the stabil-
ity and coherence of the New Deal state by looking forward in time.49 
As is clear from the citations in the last paragraph, historians within 
the legal academy have played a major role in shaping both revisionist 
projects.  Ernst’s Tocqueville’s Nightmare constitutes a vital contribu-
tion to the second project, identifying surprising legal and political con-
tinuities in the development of the administrative state from the turn of 
the century to WWII, a period that is best known for rapid legal and 
political change.  In addition to an emphasis on continuity, the most 
striking methodological aspect of Ernst’s history is its sensitivity to the 
ceaseless interplay of law and politics (p. 7).  Most immediately, this 
sensitivity aims to overcome a divide that has long separated historians 
of the New Deal: internalists who emphasize gradual doctrinal evolu-
tion, and externalists who emphasize the causal power of dramatic po-
litical events.  For almost as long as this divide has existed, there have 
been calls — and quite significant efforts — to overcome it,50 but 
Ernst’s synthesis of law and politics is a singular success. 
According to Tocqueville’s Nightmare, the story of the administra-
tive state’s development is largely one of gradual doctrinal evolution, 
but this is only because of the enormous political power of lawyers, 
who were able to impose a legalistic cast on administrative growth (pp. 
5, 87, 106, 125, 138, 143, 160 n.22).  Having long exercised an outsized 
political influence in American society,51 lawyers — specifically, a pa-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399 (2007); Karen M. 
Tani, Welfare and Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 
314 (2012). 
 48 See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); BARRY 
CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998); WHITE, supra note 43, at 94–127; 
Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and 
Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891 (1994); Laura Kalman, The Constitution, 
the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1052 (2005); G. Edward White, The 
Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485 (2002). 
 49 See, e.g., ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM (1995); JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE 
UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE (2012); IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF (2013); SOPHIA Z. 
LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION (2014); REUEL SCHILLER, FORGING RIVALS (2015); 
BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, FROM THE OUTSIDE IN (1996); JAMES T. SPARROW, WAR-
FARE STATE (2011); KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY (forthcoming 2016).  
 50 See Kalman, supra note 48, at 1055, 1074–79 (calling for a “synthesis,” id. at 1055, and not-
ing prior gestures in that direction); see also, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 48, at 279–312 (offering 
a synthetic account); WHITE, supra note 43, at 94–127 (same). 
 51 Tocqueville himself famously remarked on the peculiar dominance of lawyers in the United 
States.  1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 325 (Henry Reeve trans., 
Longman, Green, Longman & Roberts 1862) (1835) (“The government of democracy is favourable 
to the political power of lawyers . . . .”).  For the origins and effects of this dominance, see LAW-
YERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM 28–30 (Terence C. Halliday & 
Lucien Karpik eds., 1997); CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE 
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trician group of New York corporate lawyers — were in a strong posi-
tion to persuade public officials in need of authority, private citizens in 
need of reassurance, and other lawyers in need of continued employ-
ment, that legal doctrines about administrative decisionmaking could 
constitute an autonomous and enduring form of expert knowledge, one 
that could not be replaced by alternative forms of administrative ra-
tionality and legitimation.  The more successful these lawyers were in 
constructing the autonomy of administrative law, the more their politi-
cal influence grew.  Both the “legalism” and the legitimacy of the 
American administrative state were the result of this dialectic between 
lawyerly power and legal knowledge (p. 106). 
Ernst’s focus on the interplay of law and politics is not simply a re-
sponse to a particular problem within New Deal historiography.  It is 
also a hallmark of what might be called the new “legal history of ad-
ministrative governance.”  Mingling American legal history’s continu-
ing debts to legal realism and the critical legal studies movement52 
with insights from American political science53 and European social 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 20–25 (1993); Forbath, Politics, supra note 36, at 645–50; Robert 
W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, 1870–1920, in 
PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70, 95 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 
1983). 
 52 For an excellent overview of these debts, see Jessica K. Lowe, Radicalism’s Legacy: Ameri-
can Legal History Since 1998, 36 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR NEUERE RECHTSGESCHICHTE 288 
(2014).  For a discussion of how the “new constitutional history” has self-consciously taken up the 
influences of legal realism and critical legal studies and combined them with insights from social 
history and legal anthropology, see Risa Goluboff, Lawyers, Law, and the New Civil Rights Histo-
ry, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2326 (2013) [hereinafter Goluboff, Lawyers] (reviewing KENNETH 
W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER 
(2012)); Risa Goluboff, The New Constitutional History: Toward a Manifesto (Mar. 3, 2013) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  The legal history of ad-
ministrative governance shares much in common with this new constitutional history, which, as 
described by Professor Risa Goluboff, emphasizes the contingency and pluralism of constitutional 
law, and the agency of “everyday” citizens and social movements in shaping that diverse and inde-
terminate legal field.  See Goluboff, Lawyers, supra, at 2329.  Indeed, several recent legal histories 
of administrative governance can be read as signal contributions to the new constitutional history.  
See, e.g., LEE, supra note 49; SCHILLER, supra note 49; TANI, supra note 49.  Such overlap  
between the two fields is not surprising given the constitutional stakes, both in terms of structure 
and rights, implicit in the development of administrative governance as its own modality of  
rule.  At the same time, the legal history of administrative governance may stray from — or sup-
plement — the new constitutional history by emphasizing the agency of state actors over “every-
day” citizens, by recognizing the ways in which state-builders may self-consciously and effectively 
limit legal contingency and pluralism, and by expressing skepticism about the existence of a social 
world that is not always already shaped by state management and control. 
 53 Specifically, American political development, see KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN 
SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (2004); the “new 
institutionalism,” see THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter 
W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); and the study of bureaucratic autonomy, see CARPEN-
TER, supra note 39. 
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and political theory,54 this emerging subfield looks to the variety of in-
stitutions and actors — from federal commissions to municipal health 
boards to urban reform organizations, from cabinet secretaries to state 
and territorial courts to local volunteers — that have administered the 
American territory, creating order, legitimacy, and a sense of national 
belonging even in the absence of a predominant national bureaucracy.  
Unsurprisingly, this approach first asserted itself in the revisionist ef-
fort to root the American administrative state in institutions and ideo-
logies that predated the canonical late-nineteenth-century and New 
Deal origin stories.55  But legal historians in the second revisionist 
camp have also taken up administrative “governance,” exploring the 
continuities and contradictions that marked twentieth-century admin-
istration both inside and outside the national executive.56 
The rhetorical shift from “state” to “governance” most obviously 
indicates an effort to break free of earlier accounts of nation-building 
that emphasized a more-or-less linear path toward a singularly “mod-
ern” form of state apparatus — a highly centralized and hierarchical 
executive bureaucracy.57  But the use of the term “governance” also 
tends to indicate a more general agnosticism toward traditional divi-
sions between “state” (agencies, legislatures, and, on some accounts, 
courts) and “society” (bar associations, think tanks, settlement houses, 
protests, strikes), and between law and politics.  The goal is not to re-
duce state to society or law to politics, but rather to understand how 
the relative autonomy of each of these arenas is a product of historical 
struggle, as various actors have sought to draw and redraw the bound-
aries between state, society, law, and politics in order to achieve their 
governmental objectives.58  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 54 Especially notable has been the influence of Michel Foucault’s theory of governmentality as 
an alternative to conventional Weberian and Marxist understandings of the administrative state, 
which tend to treat the development of the American administrative state as peculiarly arrested.  
See, e.g., Novak, supra note 46, at 772 (citing THE FOUCAULT EFFECT (Graham Burchell, Colin 
Gordon & Peter Miller eds., 1991); NIKOLAS ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM (1999)). 
 55 See, e.g., NOVAK, supra note 45; TOMLINS, supra note 51, at 35–59 (applying Foucault’s 
analysis of “police” to the early American Republic). 
 56 See, e.g., MEHROTRA, supra note 47, at 8, 19, 30; SCHILLER, supra note 49, at 30; 
WILLRICH, supra note 47, at 78, 80, 212, 301, 327; Ernst, supra note 47, at 1; Forbath, Politics, 
supra note 36, passim; Kessler, supra note 47, at 1085 n.4, 1091 n.22; Tani, supra note 47, at 322, 
375–76, 378, 380. 
 57 See generally Forbath, Politics, supra note 36; Novak, supra note 46. 
 58 See, e.g., William J. Novak, Stephen W. Sawyer & James T. Sparrow, Beyond Stateless De-
mocracy, 36 TOCQUEVILLE REV., no. 1, 2015, at 21, 31 (“[D]emocracies constantly distribute and 
redistribute, negotiate and renegotiate power between state and society.  The traditional opposi-
tion between state and civil society, state and democracy simply does not hold up to empirical 
scrutiny or historical reality.  The quest for a new history and theory of the democratic states is 
rooted in the search for a more synthetic understanding of the state-society relationship at the 
heart of the democratic project.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Timothy Mitchell, The Limits of the State: 
Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 77, 77–78 (1991). 
  
2016] THE STRUGGLE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LEGITIMACY 731 
Tocqueville’s Nightmare provides an exemplary history in this vein, 
tracking the efforts of elite early-twentieth-century lawyers to con-
struct one boundary between administrative law and administrative 
politics while eroding another boundary between the administrative 
state and the legal profession.  The historical success of these particu-
lar acts of boundary-drawing is evidenced by contemporary legal 
scholarship that continues to emphasize the depoliticization of admin-
istrative law, the legalism of the administrative state, or both.59 
II.  LAWYERLY ADMINISTRATION:  
BETWEEN NIGHTMARE AND UTOPIA 
The central claim of Tocqueville’s Nightmare is that we have avoid-
ed Tocqueville’s nightmare.  In his famous reflections on Jacksonian 
America, Alexis de Tocqueville argued that the nation’s lack of “cen-
tralized administration” was a very good thing.60  Given the American 
people’s commitment to popular sovereignty, if a powerful federal bu-
reaucracy ever did emerge at its head, “a more insufferable despotism 
would prevail than any which now exists in the monarchical states of 
Europe; or indeed than any which could be found on this side of the 
confines of Asia” (p. 1).61  Tocqueville had visited the United States at 
a moment when the phenomenon of the mass party was beginning to 
emerge, and his warning can be read as an intuition of how the trinity 
of popular sovereignty, mass party, and centralized administration 
might produce something like totalitarianism — a mode of governance 
in which the national population authorizes its own domination.62 
During the New Deal — particularly at the moment of President 
Roosevelt’s reelection in 1936 — the United States came as close as it 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 59 See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT 51–203 (2012); Neal Kumar 
Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 
115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006); Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 402; Trevor W. Morrison, 
Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1692–93 (2011) (reviewing BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010)). 
 60 1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 51, at 319. 
 61 The author quotes 1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 51, at 320.  
 62 For the rise of the mass party in the United States and its continental correlates, see 
GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS (2002).  For the trope of Tocque-
ville as theorist of totalitarianism, see FRANÇOIS FURET, INTERPRETING THE FRENCH REV-
OLUTION (Elborg Forster trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1981); CLAUDE LEFORT, The Question 
of Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL THEORY 9, 9–20 (David Macey trans., Univ. of 
Minn. Press 1988); MATTHEW MANCINI, ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE AND AMERICAN IN-
TELLECTUALS (2006); J.L. TALMON, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIAN DEMOCRACY (1952).  
For recent critiques of Tocqueville’s vision of the liberal state and its enemies, see generally Mar-
tin Malia, Did Tocqueville Foresee Totalitarianism?, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2000, at 179; and  
Stephen W. Sawyer, Beyond Tocqueville’s Myth: Rethinking the Model of the Liberal State,  
in BOUNDARIES OF THE STATE IN US HISTORY 57 (James T. Sparrow, William J. Novak &  
Stephen W. Sawyer eds., 2015). 
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ever would to forging this supposedly perilous trinity.63  Yet no night-
mare took place, no “insufferable despotism” arose.64  Nor did the 
American government, faced with an ongoing economic crisis and  
a looming war against fascism, succumb to the judicial utopias of  
nineteenth-century liberalism, which conflated the rule of law with the 
rule of courts.  Thankfully, Daniel Ernst argues, a politically moderate 
but intellectually modern group of lawyers, convinced of both the ne-
cessity and the danger of autonomous, centralized administration, had 
been laying the theoretical and practical groundwork for a “liberal 
administrative state” since the first years of the twentieth century (p. 
5).  When the time came, their unique model of lawyerly administra-
tion — autonomous yet fair, procedurally constrained yet free of overly 
onerous judicial review — became the principle of American power. 
The enormous empirical and conceptual success of Tocqueville’s 
Nightmare lies in Ernst’s reconstruction of how reform-minded Wall 
Street lawyers, typified by Charles Evans Hughes and John Lord 
O’Brian, negotiated a careful break with nineteenth-century liberal-
ism.  According to Ernst, two nineteenth-century models were particu-
larly significant: the German ideal of the Rechtsstaat, imported to the 
United States by the administrative law scholar Ernst Freund; and the 
Anglophone ideal of the “rule of law,” theorized by the Oxford lawyer 
Albert Venn Dicey and championed by bar associations across turn-of-
the-century America (pp. 2, 30).  Both models proposed to constrain — 
and legitimate — a burgeoning administrative state by means of exten-
sive judicial review.  But neither was capable of explaining how an 
administrative state so fettered could meet the practical challenges 
posed by a nation undergoing both rapid economic growth and escalat-
ing economic conflict.  Ernst’s Wall Street lawyers offered a way out of 
this bind by unbundling the conflation of administrative legitimation 
and judicial review (p. 143).  Courts would remain responsible for su-
pervising certain aspects of administrative decisionmaking — those 
that raised questions legal professionals were most competent to judge, 
such as a decision’s statutory or constitutional authority.  But the ad-
ministrative state would legitimate the balance of its operations by in-
ternalizing procedural norms familiar from the common law: the rela-
tive separation of prosecutorial and judicial functions, the evenhanded 
development of a factual record, and the reasoned explanation of a de-
cision in terms of that record. 
The book’s weakness lies in its suggestion that this unbundled 
“Diceyism” was the straightest and most durable road between the ju-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 63 See KATZNELSON, supra note 49, at 39–40 (developing the argument that, in the 1930s, the 
United States faced a real danger of succumbing to totalitarianism). 
 64 1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 51, at 320. 
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dicial utopias of the nineteenth century and an underspecified “night-
mare” of lawless administrative discretion, a nightmare given rhetori-
cal heft by the specter of European totalitarianism lurking in the his-
torical background.  By implicitly accepting the framework of 
Tocqueville and his latter-day acolytes, Ernst places a thumb on the 
scales in favor of legalistic — and antidemocratic — sources of legiti-
macy.  The result is to stint the more left-wing political, economic, and 
legal voices that Ernst’s Wall Street protagonists successfully silenced 
on their path to victory.65  These were the voices of New Deal  
stalwarts both inside and outside the legal fraternity, who were  
more antiformalist and anticourt, more pro-administration and —  
crucially — more prolabor, than even the most reform-minded corpo-
rate lawyers could countenance.  They believed that an autonomous 
administrative state was necessary to achieve a more just distribution 
of the nation’s resources, and that the achievement of this political 
economic goal, along with democratic support and expert guidance, 
were the sufficient conditions of the state’s legitimacy.66 
Ernst certainly does not intend to imply, with his antagonists in the 
Tea Party and the “Constitution in Exile” movement, that such beliefs 
were nightmarish or totalitarian.  Indeed, the book’s first and final 
chapters offer relatively sympathetic portraits of the unabashedly pro–
New Deal legal realists Felix Frankfurter and Jerome Frank.  Yet 
Tocqueville’s Nightmare suggests that the intellectual and political 
commitments of such men (and women67) were largely accommodated 
by the limitations on judicial review of administrative decisionmaking 
implemented by Wall Street’s rule of lawyers.  In doing so, the book 
elides the fact that many New Dealers viewed the bar — not just the 
bench — as a major threat to a socially and economically egalitarian 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 65 The use of the totalitarian specter both to explain and justify mid-twentieth-century politi-
cal moderation is something of a leitmotif in recent American historiography.  See, e.g., DAVID 
CIEPLEY, LIBERALISM IN THE SHADOW OF TOTALITARIANISM (2006); KATZNELSON, supra 
note 49; ANNE M. KORNHAUSER, DEBATING THE AMERICAN STATE (2015).  For a partial 
critique of this approach, see Jeremy K. Kessler, The Last Lost Cause, JACOBIN, Spring 2013, at 
96 (reviewing KATZNELSON, supra note 49).  Perhaps the most striking aspect of the “totalitari-
an specter” literature is its relative lack of interest in those mid-century thinkers who most explic-
itly hypothesized a dangerous affinity between liberal democracy and totalitarianism.  See, e.g., 
HERBERT MARCUSE, The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State, in 
NEGATIONS: ESSAYS IN CRITICAL THEORY 1 (Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., 1968) (1934).  Sincere 
antitotalitarians like Marcuse are hard to fit within the “totalitarian specter” paradigm because 
they understood liberalism as a way station on the road to totalitarianism, not its existential an-
tagonist.  If, as these thinkers argued, totalitarianism was an outgrowth of liberalism, then the 
defense of liberal ideals that became so prevalent in mid-century America can be understood as 
neither a necessary nor a rational response to the totalitarian threat. 
 66 See William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 53–61 
(1999); Forbath, Politics, supra note 36, at 650–54. 
 67 See LANDON R.Y. STORRS, THE SECOND RED SCARE AND THE UNMAKING OF THE 
NEW DEAL LEFT (2013). 
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society.  Ernst’s overarching goal — to prove that the modern adminis-
trative state was designed around traditional constitutional principles 
of individual rights, limited government, and due process — may re-
quire this sidelining of such antilegalist New Dealers.  Part III below 
discusses whether this marginalization of the legal and political left is 
historically or strategically sound.  This Part focuses on Ernst’s ac-
count of how legal and political moderates transcended the nineteenth-
century utopias of judicial supremacy while establishing the “rule of 
lawyers” in their place. 
A.  Two Utopias: Freund’s Rechtsstaat and Dicey’s “Rule of Law” 
In the first two decades of the twentieth century, Ernst Freund was 
the preeminent American theorist of administrative law.  Although 
born in the United States, he had studied in Berlin just as liberal 
German nationalists were instituting a system of administrative justice 
designed to constrain their “revanchist, aristocratic” bureaucracy (p. 
10).  The liberals’ ideal, the Rechtsstaat (literally “state of law”), was a 
bureaucracy governed by detailed statutory delegations and both col-
lateral and final judicial review of administrative action by specialized 
courts.  These administrative courts — mixed bodies of executive offi-
cials and generalist judges — would gradually develop a set of bright-
line rules to delimit bureaucratic decisionmaking (pp. 9–10). 
American reformers certainly did not face the same problem as 
German liberals — how “to keep a royal government from playing fa-
vorites” (p. 12).  But Freund and many of his contemporaries per-
ceived an analogous risk in the state and federal bureaucracies emerg-
ing in turn-of-the-century America: patronage politics and party rule 
threatened to infuse the administrative state with corruption, incompe-
tence, and, most dangerously, populism.  The great Prussian theorist of 
the Rechtsstaat, Rudolph von Gneist, had envisioned administrative 
courts as arbiters of fairness, “purged of . . . selfish class interests,” and 
Freund believed a similar purge was necessary in the American con-
text (p. 11).68  This purge would be easier, in a way, because “the 
American system of review by courts of general jurisdiction” provided 
for more independence than the German administrative courts, which 
included members of the aristocratic bureaucracy as well as civil law 
judges (p. 12). 
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While Ernst Freund acquired his taste for judicial supremacy from 
German Rechtsstaat theorists, early-twentieth-century American law-
yers were more likely to invoke an alternative English source —  
Albert Venn Dicey’s Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of 
the Constitution69 (pp. 30–33).  Writing at a moment when expanded 
administrative governance was on the agenda of English as well as 
American reformers, Dicey developed his account of the “rule of law” 
by contrasting it with the French droit administratif (“administrative 
law”).  The English model, Dicey argued, differed from the French in 
two crucial respects: first, under the rule of law, “no man [was] pun-
ishable . . . except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordi-
nary legal manner before the ordinary Courts of the land”; second, 
every person, including every government official, was “subject to the 
ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of ordinary 
[judicial] tribunals” (p. 30).70  This vision of judicial supremacy was 
bottomed on the belief that common law courts were the preeminent 
expositors and guardians of individual liberty, the institution that 
shielded the citizen from the willfulness of executive officials. 
Dicey’s Lectures offered a kind of delegitimating narrative, a history 
of English law in which an autonomous administrative state had no 
rightful place.  This history was largely a fantasy, as Dicey himself 
would partly concede in 1915.71  But his fantasy continued to enchant 
American lawyers, “inclined by habit and training to prefer the court 
over the administrative tribunal” (p. 32).72  And given the social stature 
of American lawyers, their inclinations mattered.  While recent scholar-
ship has demonstrated that the nineteenth-century executive branch 
played a greater role in the nation’s social and economic life than previ-
ously thought,73 it remains the case that at the dawn of the twentieth 
century, “elite lawyers and federal and some high state court judges . . . 
enjoyed the authority and occupied the social and governmental space 
that central administrative state elites claimed elsewhere.”74  They 
found in Dicey’s “rule of law” a historical and theoretical justification 
for their immense social power.  Proponents of an administrative state 
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largely free of judicial interference had their work cut out for them, as 
such a mode of governance appeared to pose a direct threat to the law-
yering class and the economic interests they served. 
B.  The Fall of Freund’s Rechtsstaat — and the Disappearance  
of Felix Frankfurter 
While the Rechtsstaat’s form of judicial supremacy might have 
served equally well to protect lawyers and their clients, its foreign ac-
cent and emphasis on bureaucratic rationality were unlikely to appeal 
to the American common lawyer.  If Freund’s effort to import the 
German model was to succeed, it would need considerable support 
from more intellectually open-minded elites in the New York bar and 
the legal academy.  Such support, however, was not forthcoming.  As 
the first chapter of Tocqueville’s Nightmare recounts, the East Coast 
legal elite deferred to a blistering critique of Freund’s program offered 
by Felix Frankfurter — a younger but more lucid legal scholar — and 
his cohort of Harvard Law–trained acolytes (pp. 19–22). 
In the early 1920s, Felix Frankfurter had a “radical” reputation (p. 
17).  A capacious legal thinker, Frankfurter was also a suspect one due 
to his Jewish heritage and support for pacifists, immigrants, anarchists, 
and labor activists in their struggle for fair — even special — treat-
ment.  Yet as judicial and academic titans such as Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Louis Brandeis, and Harlan Fiske Stone recognized, Frank-
furter’s legal advocacy on behalf of critics of American power was in 
keeping with his own thoroughly nationalist and statist ideology.  
Frankfurter simply believed that the legal accommodation of dissent-
ers was one aspect of building a strong state in a diverse, conflict-
ridden nation.75  Unfortunately for Freund, Frankfurter believed that 
another aspect of building such a strong state was getting rights-
obsessed judges out of the business of administration. 
Most fundamentally, Frankfurter objected to Freund’s standard for 
judging the practical and normative success of a given administrative 
scheme: “whether private interests are adequately safeguarded” (p. 
19).76  For Frankfurter, the task of administration was the expert bal-
ancing of private and public interests, not the sacrifice of the former to 
the latter.  “[W]e can’t consider whether private interests are safe-
guarded without equally considering the public interests that are as-
serted against them,” he reasoned (p. 19).77  What mattered for Frank-
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furter was that “substantive justice” be done “both to public and pri-
vate interests” (p. 19).78  As he would put it in a landmark 1927 article, 
the ultimate Task of Administrative Law was to “fashion[] instruments 
and processes at once adequate for social needs and the protection of 
individual freedom.”79  This late-1920s call for a synthesis of private 
rights and public welfare would be taken up by New Dealers such as 
Solicitor General Stanley Reed, who in 1935 warned that “[c]laims of 
individual liberty may in reality be claims to domination over others” 
(p. 141).80 
Frankfurter believed that administrators, not judges, were in the 
best position to strike the appropriate balance between public and pri-
vate interests crucial to avoiding such domination.  If the priority of 
Freund’s Rechtsstaat “was the constraint of administrative discretion,” 
Frankfurter’s priority “was the freeing of administrators from the 
oversight of common-law courts.”81  The young radical was not blind 
to the risk of abuse, even constitutional abuse, from unchecked admin-
istrative action.  But he insisted that the constitutional stakes of ad-
ministrative law did not merit the imposition of legalistic constraints 
by courts of law.  Rather, “[u]ltimate protection” against unconstitu-
tional administrative action was “to be found in the people themselves, 
their zeal for liberty, their respect for one another and for the common 
good.”82  In addition to this political check, Frankfurter also argued 
that a culture of legal and bureaucratic professionalism would keep the 
administrative state on the right course: “a highly professionalized civil 
service, an adequate technique of administrative application of legal 
standards, a flexible, appropriate and economical procedure . . . and a 
constant play of criticism by an informed and spirited bar.”83 
By the time Frankfurter wrote The Task of Administrative Law, his 
views were winning out over Freund’s.  In 1926, Freund had finished a 
“massive manuscript” (p. 22) that tried to prove that American state 
and federal bureaucracies were moving in the direction of a German 
system of administrative law (pp. 22–25).84  “[T]he few legal scholars 
who read the book,” however, “were unconvinced” (p. 25).  They shared 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 78 The author quotes Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Ernst Freund, supra note 76. 
 79 Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 617 (1927). 
 80 The author quotes Reed Makes Plea for Liberal Aims, WASH. EVENING STAR, May 30, 
1935, at A2.  
 81 Daniel R. Ernst, Ernst Freund, Felix Frankfurter, and the American Rechtsstaat: A Transat-
lantic Shipwreck, 1894–1932, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 171, 173 (2009). 
 82 Frankfurter, supra note 79, at 618. 
 83 Id. 
 84 The author cites Letter from Ernst Freund to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 7, 1927) (on file with 
the Commonwealth Fund, Rockefeller Archive Center). 
  
738 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 129:718 
Frankfurter’s view that “Freund’s focus on private right to the exclu-
sion of public policy and the social interest was ‘one-sided’” (p. 25).85  
In the first years of the Great Depression, then, it was Frankfurter’s 
punchy administrative law lectures, The Public and Its Government, 
that pointed the way forward: “government by expert administrators 
free to act as their scientific ‘temper of mind’ led them,” checked by pol-
itics and professionalism, not common law courts (p. 26).86  This vision 
of an emancipated administrative state coincided with a substantive po-
litical economic agenda.  For all their talk of science, expertise, and effi-
ciency, Frankfurter and the New Dealers he trained were no mere tech-
nocrats.  The radicalism of Frankfurter’s plans for a popular and 
professional bureaucracy freed from judicial control can be glimpsed in 
a 1931 letter he wrote to a friend at the New Republic.  “Ministers in 
business and finance . . . should fall when they make miserable fail-
ures,” Frankfurter insisted, referencing the economic catastrophe that 
had recently seized the nation.  Yet “[o]ur kings of finance and captains 
of industry are all in office.”  This could not go on.  “Commanders-in-
chief . . . who bring such disasters upon their country . . . are court-
martialed.  Similar treatment should be meted out to the Mellons . . . 
and all their ilk,” Frankfurter concluded.87 
Although Tocqueville’s Nightmare opens with Frankfurter’s suc-
cessful critique of the Rechtsstaat, the book has little room for Frank-
furter’s own, positive vision of politicized, professional administrators 
meting out substantive justice to the “captains of industry.”  The end 
of the first chapter shifts abruptly in chronology and ideology, from a 
fallen Freund — dead on the doorstep of the New Deal — to an as-
cendant Charles Evans Hughes, a patrician Wall Street lawyer fresh 
off his 1906 New York gubernatorial victory.  The next two chapters 
chart Hughes’s rise from reformist governor to Associate Justice to 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, each professional success bringing 
him one step closer to the transformation of Dicey’s “rule of law” into 
the “rule of lawyers,” a model of administrative legitimation grounded 
in lawyerly expertise.   
But what happened to Frankfurter, the young radical who van-
quished the Rechtsstaat and proposed a politically grounded account 
of administrative legitimacy in its place?  Tocqueville’s Nightmare 
doesn’t offer a direct answer.  Frankfurter makes passing appearances 
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later in the book, but his realist vision of administrative governance is 
simply eclipsed by Hughes’s legalist alternative.  Frankfurter’s excori-
ations of Hughes’s approach to judicial review of administrative action 
in the 1930s and 1940s are muted at best.  This marginalization  
of Frankfurter — and the realist and prolabor worldview he  
represented — is not an oversight by Ernst.  It is rather a subtle ex-
pression of Ernst’s overarching historical conclusion: that the victory 
of Hughes’s “rule of lawyers” was a total victory — and perhaps a 
foreordained one, given the social power of the American bar and the 
interests it served. 
C.  Hughes Unbundles Dicey’s “Rule of Law” 
Like most early-twentieth-century lawyers, Charles Evans Hughes 
was intuitively attracted to Dicey’s “rule of law” and its identification 
of common law principles and practices with legitimacy tout court.  As 
late as 1924, Hughes could effortlessly contrast “the law of a free peo-
ple” with “those insidious encroachments upon liberty which take the 
form of an uncontrolled administrative authority” (p. 33).  Yet nearly 
twenty years earlier, Ernst shows, Hughes had begun to transform the 
logic, if not the rhetoric, of Dicey’s “rule of law.”  What Hughes pro-
posed was to unbundle Dicey’s conflation of legitimacy and judicial 
review, dividing the tasks of administrative legitimation between judg-
es and administrators.  Judges would make sure that administrators 
remained within constitutional and statutory bounds, while basing 
their decisions on substantial evidence gleaned from a fairly developed 
record.  Administrators, in turn, would regulate their decisionmaking 
with quasi-judicial procedures, making more extensive — and imprac-
tical — judicial review unnecessary. 
As early as 1907, Governor Hughes argued that judges should not 
engage in searching, “weight-of-the-evidence review of the many mun-
dane questions that ar[i]se in the running of a utility or a railroad” (p. 
36).  Not only were administrators who devoted “their entire attention” 
to a particular industry far more competent to weigh such evidence (p. 
36),88 careful judicial review of quotidian regulatory decisions would 
“swamp the courts” and degrade their “public esteem” by implicating 
them in pocketbook politics (p. 36).89  Accordingly, judges “should 
leave ‘matters of detail’ to commissions” and instead focus on “‘real’ 
judicial questions”: whether the commission had violated “the constitu-
tional right to hold property and not be deprived of it without due 
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process of law” and whether the commission “had exceeded [its] statu-
tory authority and assumed ‘arbitrary power not related to public con-
venience’” (p. 36).90 
These “real judicial questions,” as Ernst notes, would later become 
known as the “constitutional fact” and “jurisdictional fact” doctrines, 
exceptions to the more deferential “substantial evidence” standard that 
applied to judicial review of most administrative factual determina-
tions.91  Progressive realists like Felix Frankfurter would see these doc-
trines as major stumbling blocks to an efficient and egalitarian admin-
istrative state, leaving pro-business judges in the position to impose 
their own notions of fairness on administrative efforts to resolve social 
conflicts between the propertied few and the needy multitude (pp. 46, 
48–49).92  Nonetheless, Ernst argues, after Hughes left Albany for the 
High Court in 1910, the Associate Justice distinguished himself by ap-
plying the constitutional and jurisdictional fact doctrines in a relatively 
pro-administration manner.  In a series of precedent-setting railroad 
and public utility cases, most notably the Minnesota Rate Cases of 
1913, Hughes “refused to use [the constitutional fact doctrine] to shift 
responsibility for most fact-finding from commissions to the courts” (p. 
41).  He also rejected the railroad lawyers’ favored argument that “the 
unreasonableness of a rate was ‘the essential jurisdictional fact,’” sub-
ject to searching, weight-of-the-evidence review (pp. 41–42).93 
Hughes’s conception of judicial review as a targeted policing of the 
constitutional and statutory boundaries of administrative authority 
was progressive in the context of the early-twentieth-century American 
bar.  But Hughes remained relatively unsympathetic to the broad dele-
gations and summary procedures that many advocates of administra-
tive government preferred.  In 1916, he left the Supreme Court for an 
unsuccessful presidential run against Woodrow Wilson, the favorite of 
legal and intellectual proponents of a large, activist state.  And while 
Hughes supported the Wilson Administration’s experiments with eco-
nomic planning and labor mediation during World War I, he saw them 
as ephemeral, emergency measures.  At war’s end, Hughes called for a 
rapid scaling back and judicialization of “the astounding spectacle of 
centralized control” that the wartime administrative apparatus had be-
come (p. 44).  While more left-wing progressives such as John Dewey 
and Felix Frankfurter hoped such an apparatus would become a per-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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manent feature of American life,94 Hughes thought it incompatible 
with legitimate peacetime governance.  In his 1919 article The Repub-
lic After the War95 and a series of addresses to Harvard Law School 
alumni, Hughes argued that agencies should vest the “different func-
tions of prosecutor and judge” in “different officials,” and should 
“make their procedures more closely approximate those of courts” (p. 
45).  As too much judicial oversight would only lead to “dilatory litiga-
tion” and “leave vast activities to the mercy of the cunning, selfish and 
avaricious” (p. 44),96 the legitimacy of administrative government de-
pended on “design[ing] agencies” in the image of courts “so as to mini-
mize the need for judicial review” (p. 45). 
By the late 1930s, Ernst argues, New Dealers themselves would 
come to accept this cooperative model of administrative legitimation, 
following the lead of Chief Justice Hughes, who had returned to the 
Supreme Court in the early days of the Great Depression.  In arguing 
that the New Deal administrative state came to embody Hughes’s un-
bundled “Diceyism,” Ernst offers a significant reimagining of what his-
torian Alan Brinkley once called The End of Reform: the radical scal-
ing back of the New Deal’s political economic ambitions.97  To 
understand why this is so, it is useful to recall the legal and political 
backdrop against which Hughes rose to power. 
D.  The Political Economy of Unbundled Diceyism 
Distinguished by his brilliance, Charles Evans Hughes was in 
many other respects a familiar figure in turn-of-the-century New York.  
A well-to-do Republican, he made his money working in the world of 
“the great metropolitan law firms founded in the first years of the 
twentieth century” (p. 6).98  Out of these firms emerged the field of 
corporate law, a specialty that owed its existence to the nation’s in-
creasingly integrated economy — and the increasingly integrated 
transportation and natural resource industries that sought to exploit it.  
While committed to economic integration and growth, Hughes and 
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like-minded Republicans were anxious about the social costs that ac-
companied these developments — impoverished immigrants, industrial 
accidents, overcrowded cities, and ceaseless, violent struggle between 
workers and owners over the conditions and price of labor.  Republi-
can reformers believed that government could, in theory, meliorate 
these problems.  Courts, however, lacked the time and specialized ex-
pertise to do so, while legislatures were “hopelessly mired in the cor-
rupt bargains of party bosses and business interests” (p. 27).  These 
same institutional infirmities also produced an inhospitable regulatory 
environment for the clients of corporate lawyers, who generally found 
predictable and expert regulation to be better for business than a mo-
rass of inexpert judicial decisions and a gray market in legislative fa-
voritism (p. 6).  Across the board, the solution was “commission” or 
administrative government. 
Administrative agencies offered the social and economic knowledge 
and efficient procedures that courts lacked, as well as “a new field of 
political influence” partly insulated from party machines and industry 
lobbying (p. 26).  While German liberals had designed their 
Rechtsstaat to counter the political power of a nearly impenetrable 
aristocratic bureaucracy, “the openness of administration in the United 
States” allowed a rising professional class of lawyers, doctors, corpo-
rate managers, and academics to view it as a vehicle for their own re-
formist and rationalizing ends (p. 26).99  Accordingly, these reformers 
did not want an overweening judiciary to smother the growth and cre-
ativity of the young administrative state. 
At the same time, Hughesian reformers shared Ernst Freund’s wor-
ry that party politics might function in a manner analogous to the Ger-
man aristocracy, infusing administration with class bias.  While recog-
nizing that efficient administration could bring stability to a society 
roiled by economic and ethnic rivalries, Hughes and his fellow corpo-
rate lawyers remained suspicious of “the people themselves,” that group 
to whom Felix Frankfurter entrusted the legitimacy of the administra-
tive state in 1927.100  As Henry Stimson would later write, administra-
tors were especially in need of legal supervision when dealing with mat-
ters “full of class feeling, bias, and counter-bias” (p. 101).101 
“Class feeling” was a decades-old source of anxiety for the Republi-
can elite.  The language of “class feeling” had emerged in full force in 
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the wake of the Civil War, when industrial workers and small farmers 
offered an unexpectedly literal interpretation of the Republican vic-
tors’ antislavery commitments to equality and “free labor.”102  The 
working classes in the North and South saw increasingly nationalized 
and internationalized networks of capital accumulation as a threat to 
their equal political and economic citizenship, a threat that could re-
duce them to a “wage slavery” little better than the racial slavery that 
the Republican North had so recently crushed.103  The same men who 
had “etched out a new conception of an active democratic state to un-
dergird the expanded powers of the federal government” during the 
Civil War and Reconstruction, now worried that “labor and agrarian 
agitators” would turn the “active democratic government” into a sword 
against “property rights rulership.”104  By the 1870s, The Nation, 
founded to trumpet the cause of abolition, decried the “politics of class 
feeling,” a politics that aimed to seize the newly powerful state appa-
ratus and turn it toward economically egalitarian ends.105 
 The Republican legal elite of New York City had stood as a bul-
wark against this threat for fifty years.  Although by the early twenti-
eth century they were coming to respect the administrative state’s ca-
pacity to rationalize capitalism, they also believed that such a state 
required constant policing lest it become captured by “class feeling” — 
the passions of the working class in particular.  Accordingly, while 
Hughes, Stimson, and their Wall Street colleagues were less enamored 
of judicial review than Freund, Dicey, or the average storefront litiga-
tor, they nevertheless believed that courts remained necessary to guard 
against the seizure of the administrative apparatus by a workers’ par-
ty.  Such a seizure was exactly what the New Deal threatened.  
Hughes’s unbundled “Diceyism” was perfectly tailored to meet this po-
litical economic threat, and the third and central chapter of Tocque-
ville’s Nightmare beautifully illustrates how Chief Justice Hughes ap-
plied his vision of administrative legitimacy to a host of high-stakes, 
New Deal legal disputes. 
E.  A Dicey New Deal 
The backdrop of Chief Justice Hughes’s tenure was economic con-
flict at home and the rise of totalitarian governance abroad.  As he 
asked a university alumni audience in the late 1930s, “[u]nder the pres-
sure of economic forces and the insidious teachings of an alien philos-
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ophy, will our democracy be able to survive?” (p. 51).106  To ensure 
that it would, Hughes vigilantly “watched for signs” (p. 56) that Amer-
ican government was descending into a “form of autocracy, whether 
contrived to promote efficiency or to establish class rule” (p. 56).107  
From Hughes’s perspective, early New Deal administration was 
marked by two such worrisome signs — an absence of rigorous 
factfinding and almost limitless legislative delegations.  While 
Hughes’s political economic opposition to “class rule” fed his distaste 
for these features of the administrative state, Ernst shows that even 
the most pro–New Deal lawyers were uncomfortable with the regime’s 
early legislative forays. 
 Felix Frankfurter, for instance, “attempted to advise the drafters” 
of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act (AAA) that the laws should require administrators to 
make “findings of fact backed with substantial evidence in support of 
their orders” (p. 56).  “Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., Frankfurter’s protégé 
and the top lawyer at the US Department of Labor, thought [the] 
NIRA ‘a most unbelievably sloppy piece of work’ that no amount of 
rewriting was likely to save” (p. 56).108  Whether these warnings were 
largely tactical, or reflected a deeper ideological agreement with 
Hughes’s vision of administrative law, is not clear.  Nevertheless, 
Ernst argues that when Chief Justice Hughes, joined by a supermajor-
ity of Justices, first limited and then struck down NIRA in 1935, it was 
not a revanchist, but a corrective act, reaffirming basic principles of 
administrative governance that progressive lawyers had long support-
ed (pp. 59–60). 
Similarly, Ernst reads the Chief Justice’s decisions involving the 
scope and intensity of judicial review of administrative factfinding as 
largely corrective.  When Hughes gave up his Associate Justiceship in 
1916, the Supreme Court had been on an “accommodating trajectory” 
(p. 56), thanks in part to Hughes’s own efforts to narrow the constitu-
tional and jurisdictional fact doctrines (pp. 43, 56).  But in the inter-
vening years, the Court had moved rightward, influenced by the ap-
pointment of the former railroad lawyer Pierce Butler, who was happy 
to reverse regulators for setting rates that deprived railroad and energy 
companies of the profits to which they were putatively entitled by the 
Constitution (p. 47).  Against this backdrop, Ernst interprets the Chief 
Justice’s 1932 decision in Crowell v. Benson109 — which approved of a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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district court’s de novo trial of two “jurisdictional facts”110 — as a 
clarification and narrowing of the jurisdictional fact doctrine, not a 
“continuation” of the strict interpretation of “Dicey’s rule of law” fa-
vored by pro-business lawyers and judges (pp. 52–56).111 
In the abstract, almost any factual question an administrator has to 
answer while faithfully implementing a statute — for example, “the 
amount of compensation that should be awarded” under a working-
men’s compensation law (p. 53)112 — can be considered “jurisdiction-
al,” as a sufficiently erroneous answer may render the administrator’s 
action ultra vires.  In Crowell, however, Hughes limited the world of 
“jurisdictional facts” to those facts that “determined whether the au-
thority under which an agency acted was authority that was in fact 
Congress’s to confer,” such as whether a maritime injury had occurred 
on navigable waters under federal authority (p. 53).  With this new 
definition, Hughes “collapsed” jurisdictional facts into the category of 
constitutional facts; only if the existence of a fact went to the ultimate 
constitutional authority of the administrative scheme was it jurisdic-
tional in nature and subject to searching judicial scrutiny (p. 53). 
Hughes also worked to limit the impact of the most infamous line 
of “constitutional fact” cases — those involving the question whether 
an administrative decision was “confiscatory” in nature,113 and thus in 
violation of constitutional due process.  It was in these cases that the 
judiciary’s role as guardian of large-scale property owners was clear-
est.  Although Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo wanted to radi-
cally scale back this role by treating administrative orders supported 
by substantial evidence as presumptively nonconfiscatory,114 Hughes 
went part of the way, instructing lower courts that something less than 
de novo review was appropriate in such cases: “judges should take the 
regulators’ ‘reasoning and findings’ into account,” should generally not 
consider new evidence absent from the administrative record, and 
should assign “a heavy burden of proof” to those challenging adminis-
trative action (p. 67).115  Lower courts got the message: by the end of 
the 1930s, Ernst announces, the jurisdictional and constitutional fact 
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doctrines were “moribund,” and “the triumph of the substantial evi-
dence standard was apparent” (pp. 70–71). 
While Hughes led the judiciary in this “orderly retreat” from inten-
sive review of administrative factfinding (p. 67), New Deal lawyers 
were hard at work correcting the regime’s earlier procedural missteps.  
Ernst takes us inside the offices of Senator Robert Wagner and the Jus-
tice Department, where young lawyers fresh from administrative law 
seminars at Harvard and Columbia judgment-proofed the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the centerpiece of the New Deal’s effort 
to unionize vast numbers of American workers (pp. 60–64).  They made 
sure that Congress’s delegation of authority to the new National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) was constrained by intelligible principles and 
supported by prevailing understandings of the legislature’s power to 
regulate interstate commerce (pp. 63–64).  The statute also made clear 
that the Board was to develop an evidentiary record in each labor dis-
pute, act only after regulated parties received notice and a hearing, and 
justify its decisions with evidence in the record (pp. 62–63). 
Lawyerly administration paid off.  Before NLRB v. Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp.116 — one of the major challenges to the NLRA’s consti-
tutionality — ever got to the courts, the NLRB “had given the [com-
pany] ample opportunity to present evidence, and the Board’s lawyers 
had carefully compiled a record showing how the company’s behavior 
burdened or threatened to burden the free flow of commerce,” the cru-
cial constitutional fact (p. 69).  In upholding the constitutionality of the 
Act, Chief Justice Hughes approvingly observed that “[t]he facts found 
by the Board support its order and the evidence supports the find-
ings.”117  He also noted that the Act provided for “complaint, notice 
and [a] hearing” in which administrators “must receive evidence and 
make findings.”118  This was good administration, and Hughes was 
happy to sign off on it. 
As Ernst summarizes Chief Justice Hughes’s approach, 
“[w]hen . . . statutes required agencies to operate within limited dele-
gations, hold adequate hearings, and adopt appropriate findings of 
fact, Hughes interpreted the relevant constitutional doctrines to uphold 
an agency’s actions” (p. 68).  When, on the other hand, administrative 
schemes failed to meet these procedural criteria, Hughes “applied [con-
stitutional] doctrines aggressively” (p. 68).  For the most part, lawyers 
within the New Deal state understood Hughes’s emphasis on good 
procedure, and they drafted the NLRA and later statutes accordingly.  
They also worked to convince less lawyerly administrators that the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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best way to avoid judicial correction was to follow the basic procedur-
al norms that courts had come to expect from even the most summary 
adjudication. 
Having painted this picture of a lawyerly “reconciliation” between 
New Deal agencies and the High Court — a reconciliation built  
on Hughes’s unbundled Diceyism and the “rule of lawyers” it promot-
ed — the central chapter of Tocqueville’s Nightmare ends in a surpris-
ing state of confusion.  The source of confusion is the Hughes Court’s 
April 1938 decision in Morgan v. United States119 (Morgan II), a deci-
sion that suggested that the basic procedural norms with which agen-
cies had to comply to secure their legitimacy might be far more expan-
sive than New Deal lawyers had previously understood.  Morgan II 
involved an order issued by the famously left-wing Secretary of Agri-
culture, Henry Wallace.  Wallace’s order lowered the rates that “com-
mission men” could charge farmers for access to the stockyards where 
meatpackers bought livestock.120  Challenging the fairness of Wallace’s 
order, the commission men argued that the Department of Agriculture 
had not given them a “full hearing” as required by statute.121  The rec-
ord revealed that the same lawyer who had represented the Depart-
ment at the administrative hearing “had also prepared the findings of 
fact and the order Secretary Wallace issued, and he had done so with-
out giving the commission men a chance to contest his version of the 
dispute” (p. 73).  This was the sort of mixing of prosecutorial and judi-
cial functions that Hughes, in the wake of World War I, had warned 
against (p. 45).  But it was — and had long been — standard practice 
in many administrative agencies (pp. 71–73). 
Chief Justice Hughes struck down the order, holding that  
when Congress required a “full hearing,” it “had regard to judicial 
standards, — not in any technical sense but with respect to those fun-
damental requirements of fairness which are of the essence of due pro-
cess in a proceeding of a judicial nature.”122  Administrators did not 
have to abide by the same procedures used in common law courts, but 
they did have to act “in accordance with the cherished judicial tradi-
tion embodying the basic concepts of fair play.”123  It was not fair play 
for an administrative factfinder to simply accept the recommendations 
of the “active prosecutors for the Government,” delivered in an “ex 
parte discussion” and without a chance for the regulated party to re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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spond.124  Morgan II, Chief Justice Hughes would later tell the Ameri-
can Law Institute, stood for the proposition that “[t]he wise adminis-
trator [should] act ‘in the spirit of the just judge’” (p. 74).125 
Ernst treats Morgan II as the definitive statement of Hughes’s un-
bundled Diceyism: “Courts would intervene to structure agencies’ pro-
ceedings in their own image so that the affected parties could bring 
egregious decisions to their attention.  Otherwise, the judges were to 
give administrators their lead” (p. 76).  But the Chief Justice’s decision 
was more than a theoretical statement.  It had enormous practical im-
plications because many agencies, including the recently formed 
NLRB, did not enforce a strict separation between trial examiners and 
factfinders (p. 63).  The federal judiciary had not previously suggested 
that the constitutional norm of procedural due process required such a 
separation, and many successful New Deal statutes did not require such 
an intra-agency division of authority (pp. 63, 75).126  Secretary Wallace 
implied that Chief Justice Hughes’s real target was the NLRB, which 
was coming under increasing fire for its favorable treatment of the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), a militant union collective 
that helped bankroll President Roosevelt’s 1936 reelection victory and 
conducted a massive strike wave in 1937 (pp. 74, 79).127 
Whether or not Wallace was right about Hughes’s political motiva-
tions, the Chief Justice’s decision hit the NLRB hard.  “Days after 
Morgan was announced,” the Board “withdrew several cases from the 
federal courts and instructed the attorneys who prepared its findings 
not to discuss cases with trial attorneys or [administrative] trial exam-
iners” (p. 75).  Nor was Morgan’s impact limited to the particularly 
controversial Labor Board.  As one journalist reported, “virtually all of 
the quasi-judicial commissions of the Federal Government are begin-
ning . . . to reexamine their procedure in light of the chief justice’s rul-
ing to see whether they are giving the citizens a full and fair hearing in 
accordance with the time honored judicial processes of fairness and 
equity” (p. 75).128  In January 1939, the Justice Department launched a 
Committee on Administrative Procedure to consider, among other 
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questions, whether “the ideal of even-handed justice . . . require[d] a 
pretty thoroughgoing separation of the prosecuting and the judicial 
staff” (p. 76).129 
Ernst offers Morgan II as the capstone of the “entente” between 
courts and the administrative state.  Yet given the upheaval the case 
caused, it is difficult to avoid the impression that Chief Justice 
Hughes’s decision sowed new doubts about administrative legitimacy, 
demanding something more of agencies than learned New Deal law-
yers had thought was necessary in designing bodies like the NLRB.  If 
the legitimacy of an administrative decision was to depend on a court’s 
after-the-fact application of the nebulous concept of “fair play,” admin-
istrative legitimacy might remain forever provisional, the artifact of a 
particular judge’s conception of fairness.  Nor could there have been 
much solace in the equation of “fair play” with “the spirit of the just 
judge.”  Administrators were not judges — that difference was the rea-
son for the former’s existence.  Administrators had different expertise, 
different mandates, and, often, different class backgrounds.  Yet if ev-
ery departure from judicial mores was a potential reason for reversal, 
then agencies would be little better off than in Dicey’s utopia, where 
their legitimacy was wholly dependent on judicial approbation. 
Such a nightmarish return of judicial supremacy was not to be.  
But the political and economic circumstances surrounding Morgan II 
all but rule out an interpretation of the decision as settling the admin-
istrative state’s legitimacy once and for all.  When the Supreme Court 
handed down Morgan II in April 1938, the United States was at the 
tail end of the bruising “Roosevelt Recession.”  This economic down-
turn had coincided with the CIO’s deeply unpopular strike wave, a 
campaign that was seen by some as a cause of the downturn, and by 
many as symptomatic of the New Deal’s irresponsible encouragement 
of the most radical elements of the working class.130  As Professor  
Barry Karl writes: “Amid declining industrial production and soaring 
unemployment, the call for more radical action was replaced by con-
cern for what the supposed radical action of the New Deal had already 
done.”131 
 President Roosevelt’s 1937 legislative proposals to pack the  
Supreme Court and consolidate administrative power in the White 
House — ginned up in the heady aftermath of his 1936 reelection and 
months before the recession hit — could not have come at a worse 
time.  The proposals outraged many of the President’s more moderate 
supporters, especially in the legal profession.  Wall Street lawyers 
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mounted well-funded lobbying campaigns that labeled the judicial and 
executive reorganization plans as brazen steps in the direction of totali-
tarian rule, products of “the insidious teachings of an alien philosophy” 
(p. 51)132 about which Chief Justice Hughes had warned at the outset 
of the Depression.133  These campaigns helped resurrect the popularity 
of judicial review, reframing the federal courts as guardians of civil 
liberty rather than economic privilege.134 
Roosevelt’s Court plan died in the summer of 1937, and “[a]n alli-
ance of southern Democrats and Republicans” rejected much of the 
rest of the President’s second-term agenda the following fall, delivering 
Roosevelt “perhaps . . . the most significant defeat of his presiden-
cy.”135  Legislative resistance to the New Deal only stiffened when 
President Roosevelt responded to his 1937 losses with a failed purge of 
anti-administration Democrats in the primaries of 1938 (p. 79).136  
Meanwhile, the American Bar Association (ABA) prepared a series of 
broadsides against the “administrative absolutism” of the New Deal (p. 
125), comparing its regulatory agenda to the illiberal regimes of Nazi 
Germany and Stalinist Russia (pp. 125–27).137  In this environment, 
Morgan II’s language of “fair play” would be used time and again to 
imply that New Deal administrators cared more about the social and 
economic power of favored constituencies than the individual rights of 
all Americans. 
The crisis of 1937–1938 did not dislodge the American administra-
tive state — it was there to stay, and would only be further entrenched 
by the following year’s military mobilization, launched in response to 
Nazi and Soviet aggression.  But the administrative state’s redistribu-
tive potential would be increasingly constrained by the legalistic con-
ception of “fair play” that men like Hughes favored, a conception that 
conveniently offered a clear distinction between American and Nazi-
Soviet governance.  Meanwhile, the progressives’ decades-long assault 
on courts as champions of the privileged few ended in a surprising re-
versal, as Americans in ever-greater numbers called on judges to  
articulate and defend their individual rights against unfair public  
regulation. 
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F.  The Politics of “Fair Play” 
The bravura penultimate chapter of Tocqueville’s Nightmare cap-
tures the crisis of 1937–1938 with a zoom lens, as Ernst documents 
how it rocked New York, President Roosevelt’s home state (pp. 78–
106).  In November 1938, the reelection campaign of Senator Wagner, 
a stalwart New Dealer and standard-bearer of the regime’s prolabor 
policies, coincided with a referendum on an amendment to New 
York’s constitution, an “anti-bureaucracy clause . . . that would greatly 
increase New York courts’ oversight of the state’s agencies” (p. 78).  
The amendment was the work of anti–New Deal trial lawyers within 
the New York State Bar Association, and a reflection of the discord 
that Roosevelt’s second term had sown in his home state (pp. 80–87).  
Ernst recounts how members of the New York City Bar — corporate 
lawyers of Chief Justice Hughes’s ilk, including Hughes’s own son — 
organized against the antibureaucracy clause, which they saw as a 
threat to rational administration and their own clients’ interests (pp. 
80–82, 84–85).  At the same time, however, these corporate lawyers 
backed the Senate candidacy of John Lord O’Brian, whose campaign 
focused on the New Deal’s unlawyerly excesses, typified by the incum-
bent Senator’s NLRA and its left-wing Board (p. 99). 
Opposed by the corporate lawyers and other moderate Republi-
cans, as well as pro–New Deal Democrats and the hard left, the 
antibureaucracy amendment was voted down by a large margin (p. 
90).  But to the great dismay of New Dealers, including President Roo-
sevelt himself, the Senate race was much closer.  A decade younger 
than Charles Evans Hughes, O’Brian had come up in the same world 
of reformist New York politics — indeed, Governor Hughes had been 
“O’Brian’s entrée to the patrician corporation lawyers of New York 
City” (p. 92).  O’Brian went on to serve in President Woodrow Wil-
son’s Department of Justice, where he tried to rein in the excesses of 
wartime prosecution of dissent (p. 92),138 and in 1935, the Roosevelt 
Administration asked him to defend the constitutionality of the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority (p. 92–93). 
O’Brian’s deep New York roots and bipartisan service made him 
an attractive candidate: not an antediluvian opponent of the adminis-
trative state as such, but someone who understood that its legitimacy 
depended on lawyerly restraint.  In 1936, O’Brian wrote an ABA re-
port that criticized the NLRB for violating “the traditional require-
ments of fair play,” forecasting the rhetoric Chief Justice Hughes 
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would use in Morgan II (p. 95).139  By 1938, O’Brian’s view was wide-
spread, and the national press — which had long castigated New Deal 
economic regulation as a threat to freedom of the press — “consistently 
condemned” the NLRB (p. 96).140  In the Labor Board, Ernst Freund’s 
decades-old warning that the administrative state might become a ve-
hicle of class rule had come to a head.  As O’Brian’s old friend from 
the New York legal world, Henry Stimson, told the New York Times, 
the NLRA’s procedures were no way to decide matters “full of class 
feeling” (p. 101).141 
The Times columnist Arthur Krock predicted that O’Brian’s can-
didacy would put “the extremes of the New Deal” on trial (p. 97).142  
And that is what O’Brian did in a short, monthlong campaign.  While 
declaring himself in agreement with the basic principles of the Wagner 
Act, he condemned the NLRB’s “secret reports and files,” “the partiali-
ty and open partisanship” of its staff, its refusal to allow employers as 
well as employees to call for union elections (p. 99),143 and its mixing 
of prosecutorial and judicial functions (pp. 98–99).  The reality was 
that many agencies mixed prosecutorial and judicial functions.  But 
O’Brian insisted that the Labor Board, the locus of New Deal class 
struggle, had to observe a higher procedural standard because it an-
swered “fundamental questions of human right and even of human 
liberty” (p. 98).144 
Although Ernst characterizes this argument as “unconvincing,” the 
idea that the political branches might merit special suspicion when 
dealing with “fundamental questions . . . of human liberty” was in the 
air (p. 98).145  It had been floated months earlier by Justice Harlan 
Fiske Stone in Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene Products 
Co.,146 handed down the same day as Chief Justice Hughes’s celebra-
tion of the “fundamental requirements of fairness” in Morgan II.  No-
tably, it was Chief Justice Hughes himself who had suggested that Jus-
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tice Stone include Footnote Four’s first paragraph, which implied that 
any law encroaching on the Bill of Rights — including the Fifth 
Amendment — might be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.147 
O’Brian’s libertarian critique of the NLRB had legs.  On Novem-
ber 1, 1938, the New York Times endorsed O’Brian for Senate, and five 
days later, the New York Daily News reported that, “[f]or the first time 
since Franklin D. Roosevelt crushed Herbert Hoover and shattered the 
Republican organization with the power of his New Deal appeal,” “the 
political dominance of the President is in peril” (p. 102).148 
In the end, O’Brian “carried every county above the Bronx save  
Albany,” but lost New York City by a wide margin, and with it, the 
election (p. 104).  Nonetheless, he garnered over two million votes, and 
cut Wagner’s 1932 margin of victory by forty percent.  As Ernst astute-
ly observes, the surprising tightness of the race was almost as good as a 
victory in accomplishing the O’Brian camp’s goal — triggering a “reas-
sessment of national labor policy” and New Deal administrative proce-
dure more generally (p. 104).  “Roosevelt’s expenditure of so much capi-
tal on what ought to have been the easiest of senatorial campaigns” was 
a disaster in light of the wave of congressional and gubernatorial de-
feats for New Dealers elsewhere in the country (p. 104). 
In the wake of the election, the press reported that “‘a careful 
stock-taking has gone on in these last few days’ among ‘the New 
Dealers whose great object is the transformation of the Democratic 
party into a New Deal or “progressive” party’” — that is, among the 
New Deal’s most economically and racially progressive supporters (p. 
104).149  “[T]he validity of certain attacks on the WPA and the Labor 
Relations Board” had been recognized, and there was a growing con-
sensus within the Administration that NLRB “must cease to have a 
partisan flavor” (pp. 104–05).150  As Ernst concludes: “Political observ-
ers interpreted [O’Brian’s] surprisingly strong showing as a sign that 
attacks on the procedures of the New Deal’s agencies might succeed 
when calls for their abolition or subjection to judicial tutelage would 
fail” (p. 106).  Going forward, the “political legitimacy” of the “nation’s 
bureaucrats” would depend on “the legalism of the American adminis-
trative state” (p. 106). 
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Ernst’s own language here is ambiguous: did the 1938 elections re-
veal a consensus on the legitimacy of the administrative state or a con-
sensus on how best to delegitimate it going forward?  Electoral results 
are famously difficult to interpret, but even on Ernst’s own interpreta-
tion, what the 1938 electoral season seems to reveal is a widespread 
belief (at least among lawyers, the press, and upstate New Yorkers) 
that, while judges should not be tasked with the job of breaking the 
New Deal state, that state was a rough beast, coursing with class feel-
ing and best housed in a legalistic cage. 
The final chapter of Tocqueville’s Nightmare only strengthens the 
sense that administrative legitimacy was very much in medias res at 
the end of the 1930s.  The task of this chapter is to explain why Con-
gress’s passage of the Walter-Logan bill in 1940 is not evidence of deep 
disagreement about the legitimacy of administrative government.  
Walter-Logan was based on a model law prepared by staunchly anti–
New Deal members of the ABA, and threatened to subject many ad-
ministrative agencies to expanded judicial review and a host of new 
formal procedures.151  In December 1940, however, President Roose-
velt vetoed the designs of a growing number of administration skeptics 
in the Bar and Congress, citing the need for streamlined administra-
tion as the country mobilized for a potential war with Nazi Germany 
(pp. 137–38).152  Ernst provides an ingenious if ultimately unsatisfying 
explanation of this fierce political battle over the minimum legal con-
straints necessary to legitimate the administrative state. 
Walter-Logan has generally been thought to have possessed the im-
primatur of the former Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound.  
The model law on which it was based was published in the same issue 
of the ABA Annual Report as Pound’s Report on Administrative Pro-
cedure — a famously inflammatory document that denounced the New 
Deal for its “administrative absolutism” and compared its defenders to 
Soviet legal theorists (pp. 125–26).153  But while Pound would later 
“unambiguously endorse[]” Walter-Logan (p. 135), Ernst shows that he 
never actually signed on to the ABA model law (pp. 122–23).  More 
significantly, Ernst argues, Pound was led to support the model law’s 
congressional codification, as well as to write his own fiery Report, 
mainly because of academic politics — his ongoing fight with un-
abashedly pro-administration legal realists such as Felix Frankfurter, 
Jerome Frank, and James Landis, who had replaced Pound as Dean of 
Harvard Law School.  In actuality, Ernst argues, Pound’s vision of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 151 See Brazier, supra note 137, at 210–12. 
 152 See also Kathryn E. Kovacs, A History of the Military Authority Exception in the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 689–90 (2010). 
 153 See Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 331, 343, 
361 (1938). 
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administrative legitimacy “converged on about the same position” held 
by Hughes and O’Brian: “The courts would insist on due process with-
in the agency.  Due process within the agency would make further ju-
dicial review unnecessary” (p. 125).  Were it not for internecine aca-
demic warfare, then, Pound “would be seen today as what he in fact 
was: another sign of an emerging consensus that the structural and 
procedural reform of agencies would keep Tocqueville’s nightmare at 
bay” (p. 125). 
Ernst’s resuscitation of Pound as a moderate at heart depends in 
part on minimizing the immoderate goals of Walter-Logan itself.  After 
all, Pound “unambiguously endorsed” the bill, even if he did not agree 
in all respects with the earlier ABA proposal on which it was based (p. 
135).  Just as Ernst attributes Pound’s endorsement to academic pique, 
he suggests that the Walter-Logan debate as a whole was more about 
political grandstanding (“hyperbolic dialogue”) than legal transfor-
mation (p. 137).  Indeed, Ernst asserts at one point that “the final ver-
sion of the bill abandoned heightened judicial review” altogether (p. 
137).  This rhetoric of “abandonment,” however, is itself hyperbolic. 
It is true that a late Senate amendment, passed in the wake of Pres-
ident Roosevelt’s 1940 election victory, eliminated a “clearly erroneous” 
standard for judicial review of administrative factfinding, leaving only 
the “substantial evidence” standard commonly used by courts in the 
late 1930s.  But the meaning of neither standard was clear, and the co-
existence of both standards in the bill before the late amendment was 
itself a source of confusion.154  Furthermore, as Ernst elsewhere 
acknowledges, Walter-Logan would have expanded judicial review of 
agency action in a host of ways that had nothing to do with the degree 
of scrutiny that courts might apply to administrative factfinding (p. 
134).  For instance, the bill allowed “[a]nyone ‘substantially interested 
in the effects’ of a rule [to] seek an advisory opinion on its legality” 
from the D.C. Circuit, and “anyone aggrieved” by an administrator’s 
“decision” — not merely final administrative “orders” — to challenge 
the decision via formal agency hearing and circuit court review (p. 
134).155  Given these provisions, it is simply an overstatement to say 
that the final bill “abandoned heightened judicial review” (p. 137).  Fi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 154 See James M. Landis, Crucial Issues in Administrative Law, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1093 
& n.31 (1940) (noting the confusion); Shepherd, supra note 137, at 1621 (“Despite heated debate at 
earlier and later times about the provision for the clearly erroneous standard, it is unclear whether 
the provision would have had significant impact.  The courts may well already have provided 
approximately this level of review through the substantial evidence rule that they employed, al-
though the rule’s content was not entirely clear.”). 
 155 See Landis, supra note 154, at 1091–92 (“[The] known, catalyzing concept of ‘order’ is 
thrown aside by the new proposal for the concept of ‘decision,’ which is defined as ‘any affirma-
tive or negative decision, order, or act in specific controversies which determines the issues therein 
involved.’” (footnote omitted)). 
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nally, even assuming that the late deletion of the “clearly erroneous” 
standard was more significant than the bill’s retention of these other 
encroachments on administrative autonomy, that proposition wouldn’t 
be particularly helpful for the Pound-as-moderate argument — Pound 
“unambiguously endorsed” Walter-Logan months before a politically 
wary Senate excised “clearly erroneous” review from the bill.156 
In short, Ernst’s final revisionist moves — Walter-Logan as legisla-
tive sound and fury; the bill’s chief intellectual backer, Roscoe Pound, 
as a moderate turned mad by the academy — are too strong.  Al-
though based on deep archival research and close reading, these re-
interpretations fail to save many important phenomena.  The rabid le-
gal and political-economic contests over administrative government 
that shook American society in the shadow of totalitarianism cannot 
be wholly subsumed under the rubric of academic politics or congres-
sional showmanship.  Ongoing doubts about the legitimacy of the ad-
ministrative state would soon hobble New Deal agencies, dismantle 
wartime agencies, and forestall Truman’s Fair Deal.157  Such doubts 
would also lead to a gradual shift in the balance of power between 
agencies and courts, as the federal judiciary asserted greater control 
over the executive branch, at times in the name of an increasingly con-
servative Congress,158 at times in the name of the fundamental re-
quirements of fairness that Chief Justice Hughes celebrated in Morgan 
II.159  Although these requirements were “fundamental,” it turned out 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 156 Compare Shepherd, supra note 137, at 1621–22 (dating the removal of the “clearly errone-
ous” standard to November 1940, and placing it in the context of Roosevelt’s recent reelection), 
with pp. 136, 207 n.133 (dating Pound’s endorsement of Walter-Logan to May of the same year). 
 157 See MEG JACOBS, POCKETBOOK POLITICS: ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 182, 193, 225, 229 (2005) (describing the use of antitotalitarian arguments to 
challenge the legitimacy of price controls and other economic regulation); KATZNELSON, supra 
note 49, at 18–20, 369–72, 383–98, 475–80 (discussing the pivotal role played by southern Demo-
crats and anti–New Deal Republicans — the same political bloc that backed Walter-Logan — in 
weakening the administrative state throughout the 1940s); LEE, supra note 49, at 56–78, 257 (de-
scribing the conservative assault on administrative regulation of the workplace throughout the 
1940s and its long-term effects); NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, LABOR’S WAR AT HOME 207–12, 
234–45 (2d ed. 2003) (describing growing legal and political constraints on prolabor administrative 
action throughout the 1940s); MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE 17–
37 (Duke Univ. Press 1994) (1977) (describing the legal and political constraints faced by the Tru-
man Administration); Reuel E. Schiller, Reining in the Administrative State: World War II and 
the Decline of Expert Administration, in TOTAL WAR AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at 185, 188–
201 (describing increasing judicial supervision of the administrative state during the 1940s, driven 
by “the totalitarian specter”). 
 158 See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477–87 (1951) (describing the leg-
islative history of the APA and the Taft-Hartley Act as expressing a congressional “mood” of dis-
satisfaction with deferential judicial review of agency factfinding, id. at 487).  
 159 See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397, 405 (1955) (repeatedly invoking “basic 
fairness” in overturning administrative adjudication of a draft registrant’s proper classification); 
see also LEE, supra note 49 (tracing the federal courts’ encroachment on administrative control of 
labor regulation from the 1940s to the present); Schiller, supra note 157, at 196–201 (describing 
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they were not fixed, and could become more or less onerous when the 
ideological climate shifted. 
The inclusion of Roscoe Pound, one of the most vociferous anti–
New Deal voices, in Ernst’s “emerging consensus” on administrative 
legitimacy suggests a peculiarly dissonant concord.  What Ernst may 
have uncovered is not a consensus on the legitimacy of the administra-
tive state, but an agreement to continue litigating that question.  Read 
from this angle, Tocqueville’s Nightmare is one of the few essential 
briefs in a trial that has lasted three quarters of a century. 
III.  LAWYERLY ADMINISTRATION V.  
LEGITIMATE ADMINISTRATION 
Tocqueville’s Nightmare ends in 1940 with an “emerging consensus” 
on what Ernst calls the “rule of lawyers” (p. 125).  This American 
model of lawyerly administration charted a middle course between two 
sets of “alien ideologies” (p. 144): on the one hand, the “insufferable 
despotism” of Tocqueville’s darkest dreams, the rule of powerful ad-
ministrators constrained only by the shifting passions of mass politics; 
on the other hand, the judicial utopias of nineteenth-century liberal-
ism, whether embodied in the German Rechtsstaat or Dicey’s “rule of 
law.”  In the United States, administrative legitimacy would depend 
neither on popular will nor the supremacy of the courts, but on the 
“policing” of “administrative discretion” by the “legal profession,” op-
erating both inside and outside the federal bureaucracy (p. 143).  Law-
yers, whether acting as administrators, judges, litigators, or public in-
tellectuals, would make sure that the administrative state continued to 
obey the all-important principle of “due process” — or its more infor-
mal yet more expansive double, “fair play.” 
By establishing “due process” and “fair play” as the administrative 
state’s regulative principles, early twentieth-century lawyers acted to 
protect and even extend their social and economic power within Amer-
ican society, ensuring that their particular form of professional exper-
tise, initially “acquired in courts,” would remain essential in an admin-
istrative age (p. 142).  But the interests of the legal profession also 
aligned with important American ideals and constitutional norms (ide-
als and norms that lawyers in the late 1930s worked to publicize and 
popularize).  As the self-appointed police of agency government, law-
yers could protect individuals from administrative coercion, legislators 
from administrative aggrandizement, and the administrative state  
itself from becoming seized by “class feeling” — that is, prolabor poli-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
“the new judicial ascendancy,” id. at 196, and “the shift of power between agencies and courts,” 
id. at 201, that had taken place by the late 1940s); infra section III.B, pp. 762–73.  
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tics — all while permitting administrators the necessary discretion to 
manage economic and military crises. 
The existence of a late 1930s consensus on lawyerly administration 
bears both historical and normative weight in Ernst’s argument.  The 
rule of lawyers did not merely prevent the New Deal state from be-
coming Tocqueville’s nightmare.  In continuing to be the most “perva-
sive” way in which we “hold[] administrators accountable,” the rule of 
lawyers acts as a reproof to those who characterize the contemporary 
administrative state as a departure from “fundamental principles of 
American government” (pp. 142–44).  Those fundamental principles 
live on under the watchful eye of the legal profession and, perhaps just 
as significantly, under the watchful eye of a broader public inculcated 
with a legalistic conception of legitimacy.  Ernst does not develop this 
latter point at length, but it is an implicit and powerful aspect of his 
narrative.160  The political victory that the legal profession won in se-
curing managerial control over the administrative state coincided with 
a more general legalization of American political culture, as the Con-
stitution and the rule of law came to be seen as symbols of American 
exceptionalism, distinguishing the United States from its totalitarian 
enemies.161  In the background of Ernst’s microhistory of lawyerly ef-
forts to shape administrative governance is thus a macrohistory of 
law’s increasingly “hegemonic function” in American society — even as 
common law courts played a smaller role in governing it.162  The Con-
stitution is not in exile, Ernst concludes, but incarnated in the adminis-
trative state and the administered society that early twentieth-century 
lawyers built and that we have inherited. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 160 In a helpful endnote, Ernst identifies his argument with a line of historical sociology that 
sees the social power of the legal profession as a cause rather than an effect of liberal political cul-
ture (p. 160 n.22) (citing Terrence C. Halliday & Lucien Karpik, Politics Matter: A Comparative 
Theory of Lawyers in the Making of Political Liberalism, in LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF 
WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 51, at 20–34). 
 161 See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION 121–37 (2001); RICHARD 
PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 224–33 (2004); Kessler, supra note 133, at 
459–61.  See generally Aziz Rana, Constitutionalism and the Foundations of the Security State, 
103 CALIF. L. REV. 335 (2015); Wertheimer, supra note 145. 
 162 Ernst explicitly discusses the rule of lawyers in terms of “hegemony” (p. 144).  For the “heg-
emonic function of law” and an early application of Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to 
American law, see EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES 
MADE 147–48 (1974).  For theoretical accounts of how the relative hegemony of law both struc-
tures the administrative state and the society that it administers, see LOUIS ALTHUSSER, ON 
THE REPRODUCTION OF CAPITALISM 57–93, 164–70 (G.M. Goshgarian trans., Verso 2014); and 
NICOS POULANTZAS, STATE, POWER, SOCIALISM 76–92 (Patrick Camiller trans., Verso rev. ed. 
2014).  For  contemporary lawyerly hegemony in the United States, see Forbath, Courting the 
State, supra note 36, at 77–79; and Duncan M. Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal 
Thought: 1850–2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19–73 (David M. 
Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). 
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A.  Relevance Objections 
 One way of criticizing Ernst’s argument is to accept his historical 
claims while questioning their relevance in rebutting contemporary 
critics of the administrative state’s legitimacy.  Two such relevance ob-
jections stand out.  First, as discussed in the Introduction, one promi-
nent group of contemporary critics ground their arguments in an 
originalist or quasi-originalist theory of legitimation.  The administra-
tive state is illegitimate, these critics contend, in that it traduces 
Founding-era conceptions of constitutional government.163  It is not 
clear that the sort of historicist argument offered by Ernst (or Sunstein 
and Vermeule in Libertarian Administrative Law164) is relevant to this 
contention.  Demonstrating that, in the 1940s, old constitutional prin-
ciples were adopted and adapted by a new administrative bar, or mod-
ified by the passage of a “super-statute,” may simply make these 
originalists’ case for them.165 
A second, subtler relevance objection points out that, while Ernst 
may be right that the administrative state was once governed and le-
gitimated by a “rule of lawyers,” there is plenty of evidence to suggest 
that lawyers have since ceded the field to other forms of expertise and 
other sources of legitimation.  The enormous growth in presidential 
control of the administrative state may well have displaced the rule of 
lawyers, providing an alternative source of purely political legitimacy 
while limiting lawyerly influence over the administrative apparatus.166  
Likewise, the displacement of agency adjudication by agency rulemak-
ing as the primary vehicle of administrative governance may have se-
riously diminished the importance of legal — as opposed to economic, 
scientific, and political — expertise.167 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 163 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240–55 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213–25 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); HAMBURGER, supra note 17, at 3–5, 111, 227, 324.  
 164 See supra p. 720.  
 165 Of course, there are “new” and even “newer” originalisms that might well acknowledge the 
force of such arguments from historical practice and precedent.  See Stephen E. Sachs, 
Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 819–20 (2015);  
William Baude, Originalism and the Positive Turn, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY: LIBERTY L.F. (Dec. 12, 
2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/originalism-and-the-positive-turn [http://perma 
.cc/TW5Y-PRLN].  These late-model originalists, however, are much less likely to question the 
legitimacy of the administrative state in the first place. 
 166 See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 32, at 4 (“We live in a regime of executive-centered 
government . . . and the legally constrained executive is now a historical curiosity.”); Elena Kagan, 
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246 (2001) (arguing that the presidency 
has “at least a comparative primacy in setting the direction and influencing the outcome of ad-
ministrative process”). 
 167 See Vermeule, Portrait of an Equilibrium, supra note 32 (reviewing Tocqueville’s Nightmare) 
(“[P]erhaps the major expansion of the administrative state since Crowell has come not in the are-
as it addressed, but in an area it said almost nothing about: agency rulemaking. . . . Ernst focuses 
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Ernst sketches the beginning of a response to this second relevance 
objection in the Conclusion of Tocqueville’s Nightmare.  There, he ar-
gues that in the 1970s “lawyers contained the challenge [from econo-
mists] to their hegemony by adding cost-benefit analysis and other 
forms of economic reasoning to their intellectual toolkits,” and implies 
that the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), a prin-
cipal conduit of economic expertise and presidential control, remains 
under lawyerly hegemony, as “[s]even of OIRA’s eleven administrators 
have had law degrees” (p. 144).  Ernst also acknowledges the growth of 
agency rulemaking but notes that it was met by a hardcore Diceyan 
reaction in the form of “hard look” judicial review (pp. 142–43).  More 
generally, Ernst argues that post-1940 criticisms of the administrative 
state would usually be employed “selectively, to defend a particular po-
litical, professional, or scholarly interest,” and that these efforts would 
be powerfully constrained by the model of lawyerly legitimation that 
emerged victorious in the late 1930s (p. 144).  In the wake of this vic-
tory, critics of particular aspects of administrative governance tended 
to find themselves turning to lawyers, and the lawyerly rhetoric of fair 
play, to make their cases.168 
In these brief remarks, one can discern the outlines of a broader de-
fense of the continuing relevance of the rule of lawyers.  Such a de-
fense might withstand even the most extreme of counterarguments, 
advanced by Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, that con-
temporary Americans live under a “plebiscitary presidency,” in which 
the administrative state is principally “constrained by the shifting tides 
of mass opinion,”169 that is, by politics, not law or lawyers.  The genius 
of Ernst’s history lies in its recognition of lawyers and legalism as po-
litical forces, a recognition that destabilizes the law/politics distinction 
on which Posner and Vermeule’s argument depends.  According to 
Ernst, when legal elites realized the social and economic advantages of 
administrative state-building, they took on the project as their own, 
giving the administrative state their qualified blessing and appointing 
themselves as its guardians (p. 138).  In doing so, they secured their 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
on adjudication because his subjects did . . . . [But in subsequent decades,] rulemaking became 
central, encouraged by academics and judges who believed that adjudication lacked the virtues of 
generality and clarity that rules could afford.”); see also Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Al-
locating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1061–76 (2011) (arguing that a variety of 
administrative law canons have shifted decisional authority within agencies from lawyers to other 
actors). 
 168 Recent scholarship on the post–New Deal administrative state supports this claim.  See, e.g., 
RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007); LEE, supra note 49; 
SCHILLER, supra note 49; Schiller, supra note 157, at 185, 196–201; Laura M. Weinrib, From 
Public Interest to Private Rights: Free Speech, Liberal Individualism, and the Making of Modern 
Tort Law, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 187 (2009). 
 169 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 32, at 16. 
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continuing political hegemony within American society, a hegemony 
that predated the rise of the administrative state and which was brief-
ly threatened by it.170  Aided by anxieties about the lawlessness of for-
eign totalitarianism, the lawyers’ maneuver helped to enshrine the 
sanctity of legalism and, especially, constitutionalism in American po-
litical culture.  Respect for the fundamental requirements of fairness 
came to represent both a limit on the American state’s ability to mis-
treat its own citizens and a moral justification for the country’s in-
creasingly active role in world affairs.171  Today, constitutionalism re-
mains a major political force in American life, as do lawyers, its 
privileged interpreters.172 
Accordingly, Ernst could argue that while Posner and Vermeule 
may be right that formal legal constraints on the administrative state 
have withered in the decades since 1940, both executive officials and 
the “shifting tides of mass opinion”173 that guide them are shaped by a 
highly legalistic political culture.  To this extent, the rule of lawyers 
still reigns, embedding both executive action and public reaction in a 
legalistic discourse that continues to limit and legitimate American 
public policy.  This persistence of lawyerly hegemony would help ex-
plain why it falls to lawyers such as Posner and Vermeule to elucidate 
and defend a putatively lawless set of political arrangements.174  It 
would also help explain why Vermeule, in his parallel work with 
Sunstein criticizing “libertarian administrative law,”175 finds it quite 
natural to invoke the existence and authority of a depoliticized body of 
administrative law in order to defend the autonomy of what he else-
where describes as a hyperpoliticized administrative state. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 170 For the long history of lawyerly hegemony in the United States, see TOMLINS, supra note 
51, at 21–26; Forbath, Politics, supra note 36, at 694–96. 
 171 In the early- to mid-twentieth century, the New York corporate bar furnished not only the 
leaders of the American legal profession but also much of the country’s foreign policy elite.  For 
instance, three of the corporate lawyers who play central roles in Ernst’s history of the crisis of 
1937–1938 — Hughes, Stimson, and John Foster Dulles — served as Secretaries of State, and 
Stimson also served twice as Secretary of War.  For the overlap of legal and foreign policy elites, 
see Kessler, supra note 133, at 459–61; Rana, supra note 161, at 353–55; Wertheimer, supra note 
145, at 13–17. 
 172 See generally JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION (2011); DANIEL 
LAZARE, THE FROZEN REPUBLIC (1996); SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 
245–56 (2d ed. 2011); David Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 
Feb. 2016); Rana, supra note 161, at 360–83; Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret History of Amer-
ican Constitutional Skepticism: A Recovery and Preliminary Evaluation, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 
(2014). 
 173 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 32, at 16. 
 174 Cf. Harvey Mansfield, The Inevitable Imperial President, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011, at 
A12 (“Students listen to [Posner and Vermeule] and readers buy their books because they teach 
the law, not because they are professors of executive domination . . . .”).  
 175 See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 12. 
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B.  Persuasiveness Objections 
 However successful Ernst’s (hypothetical) defense of the contempo-
rary relevance of the “rule of lawyers” might be, this defense brings to 
light a second set of worries about the persuasiveness of his core argu-
ment: that a seventy-five-year-old “consensus” on the rule of lawyers 
provides a stable foundation for the administrative state’s legitimacy.  
Two ambiguous features of this consensus merit further investigation.  
First, it is not entirely clear who consented to the rule of lawyers.   
Second, it is not entirely clear what they consented to.  These ambigui-
ties may help explain why doubts about the legitimacy of the adminis-
trative state have persisted since 1940, and may render the historical 
recovery of the 1940 consensus less helpful than Ernst suggests for 
dispelling such doubts today. 
First, the who.  Toward the end of Tocqueville’s Nightmare, Ernst 
acknowledges that “[e]ven in 1940, many” lawyers still “reflexively 
looked to the courts to keep administrators in check” (p. 137).  He also 
notes that in the midst of World War II, the president of the ABA 
“complained that, under the influence of ‘continental ideas,’ New 
Dealers [in the Office of Price Administration] habitually violated 
‘rights guaranteed to the people’” (pp. 144–45).176  And it wasn’t only 
lawyers who were unconvinced by the promise of lawyerly administra-
tion.  As Congress’s 1940 push for radical administrative reform 
demonstrates, plenty of politicians and private citizens — especially 
white Southerners and businessmen — believed that Tocqueville’s 
nightmare was in the offing.177  While Ernst argues that the 
antibureaucratic furor of the late 1930s and 1940s had a minimal effect 
on the structure of the administrative process and the distribution of 
authority between agencies and courts (pp. 136–37), it is hard to inter-
pret persistent rage at administrative decisionmaking (however lawyer-
ly) as consent. 
If Ernst’s history downplays efforts to subject an already-legalistic 
administrative state to further judicial control, it has even less to say 
about those who opposed the rule of lawyers as a politically conserva-
tive constraint on administrative decisionmaking.  The final chapter of 
Tocqueville’s Nightmare demonstrates that such critics of lawyerly ad-
ministration were prominent, perhaps even dominant, within the New 
Deal state and the legal academy itself (p. 125).178  Yet Ernst focuses 
on proving that their great opponent — Roscoe Pound — did not see 
things so differently from moderates like Hughes and O’Brian.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 176 The author quotes People’s Rights Ignored, AM. L. & LAW., Dec. 21, 1943, at 5. 
 177 See KARL, supra note 94, at 153–81; KATZNELSON, supra note 49, at 272–75, 369–72. 
 178 “Pound’s academic opponents . . . had come to enjoy unprecedented power as lawyers and 
administrators in the New Deal, and they would not surrender it without a fight” (p. 125). 
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Whether stalwart New Dealers, and the prolabor and progressive con-
stituencies they represented, consented to Hughes and O’Brian’s vision 
gets less attention.  Ernst shows that in the mid-1930s, Felix Frankfur-
ter, Charles Wyzanski, and other New Deal lawyers correctly predicted 
that the first flush of New Deal legislation — the NIRA and the  
AAA — would not survive judicial scrutiny, lacking sufficiently clear 
delegations and requiring too little factfinding (p. 56).  But did all the-
se lawyers agree with Chief Justice Hughes that administrators should 
act as disinterested observers in the “spirit of the just judge” (p. 74),179 
or that the fusion of prosecutorial and judicial functions violated “fun-
damental requirements of fairness” (p. 74)?180  They certainly did not 
think so when drafting the National Labor Relations Act.  And only 
months before Hughes called on administrators to comport themselves 
“in accordance with the cherished judicial tradition” (p. 74),181 the 
newly appointed Dean of Harvard Law School, James Landis, defend-
ed the administrative synthesis of judicial and prosecutorial power, 
notwithstanding its offensiveness to the tradition of the Anglo-
American judiciary.182  It is true that the NLRB and other New Deal 
agencies “‘judicialized’ their procedures” (p. 137) in response to Chief 
Justice Hughes’s demand in Morgan II that administrators act “in ac-
cordance with the cherished judicial tradition embodying the basic 
concepts of fair play” (p. 74).183  But did they any more “consent” to 
these changes than lawyers at the NLRB consented to being purged in 
1940, in the wake of Senator Wagner’s bruising reelection fight and 
amid charges of conspiring with the Soviet Union (p. 105)?184 
Ernst emphasizes that O’Brian, Hughes, Pound, and the corporate 
bar — unlike nineteenth-century liberals, irascible storefront lawyers, 
and diehard anti–New Deal politicians — did not wish to impose ple-
nary judicial review on administrative decisionmaking.  They were 
content with only limited review for procedural fairness and statutory 
and constitutional fidelity.  Nonetheless, their celebration of both judg-
es and lawyers as the disinterested guardians of administrative fairness 
contradicted the New Dealers’ fundamentally realist conception of law.  
In 1941, Attorney General Jackson proved this conception was alive 
and well when he warned that the legal profession’s “entire philosophy, 
interest, and training . . . tend toward conservatism.”185  Judges were 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 179 The author quotes Address of Justice Hughes at Law Institute, supra note 125, at 8. 
 180 The author quotes Morgan II, 304 U.S. 1, 19 (1938). 
 181 The author quotes Morgan II, 304 U.S. at 22. 
 182 See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 3, 90–93 (1938). 
 183 The author quotes Morgan II, 304 U.S. at 22. 
 184 See also STORRS, supra note 67, at 61–66 (describing the transformation of the NLRB in 
1940 due to anticommunism). 
 185 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 313 (1941). 
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the most conservative of all.  Indeed, Jackson noted that Supreme 
Court Justices were not neutral arbiters, but instead were mired “deep 
in power politics”186 as the longstanding champions of the “the eco-
nomic power of property” over the “the power of the voters.”187  Here, 
one is reminded of the abrupt end of Ernst’s first chapter, where Felix 
Frankfurter’s model of administrative legitimacy — which emphasized 
the guidance provided by “the people themselves”188 and made no 
mention of courts — is simply left behind as the narrative turns to 
Hughes’s more elitist conception. 
Rejecting the veneration of law for law’s sake, New Deal lawyers, 
many of them Frankfurter’s students, tended to focus on the practical 
and normative impact that particular kinds of lawyering or judging 
had on society.  Thus, in 1939, SEC Chairman Jerome Frank articulat-
ed a fundamental distinction between the dangers posed by national 
economic regulators who used their discretion to limit private power, 
and local prosecutors who subjected powerless individuals to “outra-
geous, indecent, inhuman and unfair acts” (p. 131).189  “Has the SEC 
ever used the rubber hose?” was Frank’s damning rhetorical question 
(p. 131).190  This distinction between the authority of national adminis-
trators to protect the interests of the common man and the power of 
narrow-minded prosecutors to threaten his liberty and equality was an 
old progressive trope, dating back to the 1910s when wartime adminis-
trators like Felix Frankfurter and John Lord O’Brian first developed 
it.191  Yet by the late 1930s, the distinction seemed to have been lost on 
O’Brian, or at least transformed for him by the shifting balance of 
class forces in society.  Confronting a militant industrial workers 
movement empowered by congressional legislation and a cadre of ad-
ministration lawyers sympathetic to its cause, O’Brian characterized 
the NLRB as a threat to “human liberty” and demanded equal rights 
for employers when it came to adjudicating the unionization of the 
workplace (p. 98).192 
O’Brian and his supporters, the protagonists of Ernst’s history, 
suggested that a single, timeless norm of “fair play” could and should 
be applied in administrative hearings and judicial trials, in municipal 
courts and federal agencies, regardless of the interests at stake or the 
differentials in power that separated one player from another.  Tocque-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 186 Id. at viii. 
 187 Id. at xii. 
 188 Frankfurter, supra note 79, at 618. 
 189 The author quotes Jerome N. Frank, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC and  
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ville’s Nightmare persuasively demonstrates the importance of this be-
lief in convincing many lawyers that they should take a lead role in 
building, rather than undermining, the administrative state.  But it al-
so leaves the reader wondering whether anyone else was particularly 
happy about these lawyers’ architectural choices.193 
That being said, Ernst does not necessarily need to show that a 
conscious consensus on the “rule of lawyers” existed in 1940.  The 
model of lawyerly administration that Ernst has unearthed from the 
archives of moderate Republican lawyers may have achieved domi-
nance not because a majority of the American people — or even a ma-
jority of the American legal profession — embraced it.  Rather, the 
rule of lawyers may have simply imposed itself on a political no-man’s 
land, after the struggle between more popular (if extreme) administra-
tive ideologies ended in stalemate.  The historian Barry Karl has ar-
gued that the late 1930s witnessed precisely such a stalemate between 
the friends and enemies of the New Deal regime, as the twin threats of 
totalitarianism and economic crisis made the administrative state both 
unpopular and unavoidable:  
[I]n the stalemate that ensued, what later critics of American government 
would label “the deadlock of democracy” took its modern form.  It was 
less a deadlock than the persistent threat of deadlock; it was a stalemate 
broken by movements on the political gameboard that brought about use-
ful changes without giving victory to either side.194 
Crucially, Karl adds, “courts would step in from time to time, some-
times to fill the vacuum but increasingly to redress imbalances, even to 
govern.”195 
Stalemate superintended by courts is also the story that many legal 
scholars and political scientists have told about the development of the 
Administrative Procedure Act.196  According to this account, pro– and 
anti–New Deal forces settled on the APA’s notoriously vague language 
because each side believed that it would be able to convince the courts 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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that the document represented its preferred vision of administrative 
governance.197  For the New Dealers, this meant robust judicial defer-
ence to administrative factfinding, procedural requirements no more 
onerous than currently existed in administrative practice, and protec-
tion against collateral attacks on administrative decisionmaking in 
courts of law.198  For the anti–New Dealers, this meant heightened ju-
dicial scrutiny of administrative factfinding, heightened procedural re-
quirements, and new opportunities for judicial review of administra-
tive action.199  Accordingly, even as the votes were being counted, 
congressmen and administrators compiled competing legislative histo-
ries that would justify their preferred interpretations of the statute.200  
Eventually, a piecemeal process of judicial interpretation, administra-
tive response, and fresh congressional intervention produced some-
thing in between these two alternative visions of administrative law. 
A conscious subject is not necessary for a coherent structure to 
come into being.  Lawyerly administration may have become the law 
of the American administrative state without the American people 
knowing it.  The lack of a consenting subject, however, does become a 
problem if one wants to invest a structural settlement with a particular 
democratic meaning and authority.  Here, Sunstein and Vermeule’s in-
vocation of the APA as a constitutionally significant “super-statute,” 
representing a political compromise on the depoliticization of adminis-
trative law,201 may run into trouble.  If the statute’s bare language was 
the product of what Professor George Shepherd has called a “fierce 
compromise” — an agreement to continue the legal and political fight 
over the administrative state on somewhat narrower terms202 — then 
the APA is an unhelpful authority for the proposition that administra-
tive law is apolitical in character.  Indeed, the ideological swings that 
Sunstein and Vermeule trace from “progressive administrative law” to 
“libertarian administrative law”203 may actually represent the faithful 
implementation of an agreement to disagree. 
Ernst’s argument is less dependent on ex ante subjective consent.  
So long as lawyers continue to wield power both within agencies and 
the judiciary, and so long as their training continues to incline them to 
be attentive to the “fundamental requirements of fairness,” a legalistic 
public’s demands on the administrative state may be met, and a post 
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facto legitimacy may obtain.  Yet Ernst contends that the rule of law-
yers and its unbundled Diceyism have done more than simply con-
strain the administrative state.  They have also supposedly created the 
conditions for effective administrative governance: a relatively pro-
administration alternative to the nineteenth-century models of legiti-
mation that depended too heavily on narrow legislative delegations 
and overweening judicial control.  These are the models that present-
day Diceyans in the Tea Party and “Constitution in Exile” movements 
long to reimpose on the American administrative state (pp. 7–8, 142–
46).  Like Sunstein and Vermeule, then, Ernst hopes to counter the lib-
ertarian originalist attack on administrative legitimacy with a histori-
cally grounded model of his own.  Here, it is less clear that the rule of 
lawyers will do the trick, because the supposed differences between the 
rule of lawyers and the present-day Diceyans are both conceptually 
and historically unclear.  Assuming that there was and remains a con-
sensus on the rule of lawyers, what differentiates that consensus from 
the critiques of administrative legitimacy that Ernst seeks to counter? 
One important challenge that Ernst faces in divesting the rule of 
lawyers of its more Diceyan tendencies is that his chief protagonist, 
Charles Evans Hughes, remained committed to the constitutional and 
jurisdictional fact doctrines, doctrines that required heightened judicial 
review of administrative factfinding when the facts at issue went to an 
agency’s statutory or constitutional authority.204  These doctrines had 
the potential to place the administrative state back under the sign of 
Dicey, and Ernst works hard to show that Chief Justice Hughes nar-
rowed them, even while refusing to repudiate them altogether.205  But 
in writing that “[b]y the end of the 1930s” these doctrines had become 
“‘ghosts’ of their former selves,” Ernst may underestimate the ability 
of ghosts to haunt the administrative state (p. 5). 
Unlike the Chief Justice, President Roosevelt’s appointees to the 
Hughes Court were ready to repudiate the constitutional and jurisdic-
tional fact doctrines when it came to challenges to the administrative 
confiscation of property (pp. 70–71).  But they and their successors 
would adapt these doctrines to the review of administrative 
factfindings that threatened civil liberty, especially when local officials 
or national security administrators were the factfinders.206  And as re-
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cent commentators have noted, civil-libertarian justifications for 
heightened review of administrative decisionmaking can have econom-
ically libertarian effects similar to those accomplished by the old con-
stitutional fact doctrine and the substantive due process jurisprudence 
that undergirded it.207  Indeed, Sunstein and Vermeule identify the ju-
diciary’s invocation of the First Amendment to heighten review of ad-
ministrative factfinding that touches upon the expression of regulated 
parties as one of the preferred tools of the insurgent “libertarian ad-
ministrative law.”208 
To be sure, Ernst is correct that the less onerous “substantial evi-
dence” standard for review of administrative factfinding had already 
become the norm by the time that Chief Justice Hughes left the Court 
(p. 71).  Yet the meaning of “substantial evidence” underwent signifi-
cant changes in the fifteen years following the close of Ernst’s story.  
The anxieties that had roiled New York during the Senate election of 
1938 and secured congressional passage of the ABA-approved Walter-
Logan Bill in 1940 — anxieties that New Deal administrators served a 
“single class,” threatened individual liberty, and caused economic dis-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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ruption (p. 101) — never went away, and in many cases intensified 
with the coming of the Cold War.  Motivated by these same anxieties, 
Congress passed the APA in 1946 and the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.209  
The Supreme Court responded to this anti-administrative “mood” in 
1951, by calling for more rigorous application of the substantial evi-
dence standard in its Universal Camera decision.210 
Placing new emphasis on the APA’s instruction that judges “shall 
review the whole record” when determining whether “substantial evi-
dence” supports an agency’s decision,211 the Universal Camera Court 
interpreted this language to mean that judges should consider counter-
vailing as well as supporting evidence: “The substantiality of evidence 
must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its 
weight.”212  In 1941, the Attorney General’s Committee on Administra-
tive Procedure had argued that such substantial evidence review “on 
the whole record” would constitute a break with prevailing practice 
and involve courts in a weighing of evidence that was properly left to 
administrative experts.213  Ten years later, the Court said that a break 
with prevailing practice was just what the APA and Taft-Hartley had 
ordered.214 
Four years after that, the ABA pushed to impose an even higher 
“clearly erroneous” standard on administrative factfinding, the stan-
dard used by appellate courts in reviewing trial judges’ factfinding.215  
The Bar’s legislative effort was unsuccessful this time, but the eminent 
administrative law scholar Louis Jaffe noted remorsefully that “[i]n the 
opinion of some courts the [substantial evidence] test already comes 
very close to the clearly erroneous rule and some courts, whatever 
their explicit concept of the test, apply it in that spirit.”216  “It is now 
generally conceded,” he wrote, “that judicial control is a necessary 
condition of administrative law in this country.”217 
When agencies began to do more of their work through rulemaking 
rather than adjudication, courts responded with the “hard look” doc-
trine, scrutinizing the records of agency rulemaking with a new inten-
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sity.218  Ernst acknowledges this particular expansion of judicial re-
view of administrative factfinding (pp. 142–43).  But just as Sunstein 
and Vermeule attribute the procedural innovations of the 1960s and 
1970s to a departure from the APA’s 1946 depoliticization of adminis-
trative law,219 Ernst treats “hard look” review as an anomalous, 
Diceyan strain in our administrative system, an exception to the 
“[m]ore pervasive” mode of lawyerly administration instituted in the 
late 1930s (p. 143). 
In general, Ernst’s model of lawyerly administration emphasizes 
the judiciary’s role in policing procedure, not substance.  But even if 
the procedure/substance distinction is tenable in theory and borne out 
in practice, judicial control of administrative procedure seems a far cry 
from the displacement of the “rule of courts” by “the rule of lawyers,” 
the ostensible arc of Ernst’s history.  Consider two of Ernst’s most suc-
cinct summaries of the “rule of lawyers”: 
Courts would intervene to structure agencies’ proceedings in their own 
image so that the affected parties could bring egregious decisions to their 
attention.  Otherwise, the judges were to give administrators their lead.  
(p. 76) 
The courts would insist on due process within the agency.  Due process 
within the agency would make further judicial review unnecessary.  (p. 125) 
The prominence of the courts in these descriptions of the rule of law-
yers is striking.  It is the courts that get the ball rolling, structuring 
agencies “in their own image” and elaborating that mysterious quan-
tum of quasi-constitutional “due process” — the “fundamental re-
quirements of fairness” to which Chief Justice Hughes referred in 
Morgan II.220  Furthermore, as that case indicated, fundamental re-
quirements can change.  New Deal lawyers who had dutifully learned 
the procedural lessons of earlier cases were surprised by the Morgan II 
Court’s demand for some (unspecified) separation of prosecutorial and 
judicial functions.  The lawyers would once again have to change their 
approach — and some would not survive the transition, as quasi-
judicial agencies such as the NLRB were purged of their left-wing 
members in the course of ostensibly procedural reforms (pp. 104–05). 
 If this narrative is any indication — and it is a pivotal narrative in 
Ernst’s book — the model of lawyerly administration turns out to be 
surprisingly judge driven (pp. 74–76, 104–06).  Not only do courts set 
the baseline for what counts as “fair play” within the administrative 
state, they may revisit this baseline whenever presented with a puta-
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 218 See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1978); Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850–53 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 219 See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 398–400.  
 220 Morgan II, 304 U.S. 1, 19 (1938). 
  
2016] THE STRUGGLE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LEGITIMACY 771 
tively “egregious” situation (p. 76).  In this light, there is something 
paradoxical about the statement that “[d]ue process within the agency 
would make further judicial review unnecessary” (p. 125).  Due process 
within the agency would make further judicial review unnecessary, but 
the continuing availability of judicial review renders the question 
whether there is due process within the agency provisional at any giv-
en moment.  The point is not only that judicial review in such a sys-
tem is highly underdetermined (guided only by quasi-constitutional no-
tions — “due process,” “fundamental requirements of fairness,” “fair 
play”).  From the perspective of getting out from under Dicey’s rule of 
law, the most worrisome aspect of such judge-driven indeterminacy is 
that it deprives administrators of the ability to legitimate their own ac-
tions through self-regulation.  Such self-regulation will necessarily in-
volve either adherence to a previous judicial baseline, which could 
change, or a guess about a future judicial baseline, which could well 
turn out to be wrong.  Given this uncertainty, it is not clear how much 
legitimacy administrative self-regulation is capable of producing.  No 
matter how careful administrators are, their legitimacy remains in a 
state of suspension until the next trip to the courts.  Put in these ab-
stract terms, lawyerly administration sounds a lot like a recipe for the 
“recurrent sense of crisis” that James Freedman described as character-
izing American administrative governance.221 
The virtue of history is to move away from such abstractions.  Yet 
it is hard to see the post-1940 history of administrative governance as 
free of this recurrent sense of crisis.  In the immediate postwar de-
cades, courts invoked the fundamental requirements of fairness and 
human liberty not only to heighten review of agency factfinding, but 
also to impose a host of new procedural and substantive constraints on 
agencies in a variety of unexpected contexts, and to override statutory 
preclusions of judicial review, much to the astonishment of leading 
administrative law scholars.222  Ten years later, the upheaval that 
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Sunstein and Vermeule call “progressive administrative law” shook the 
state, as the D.C. Circuit imposed novel procedural constraints on in-
formal agency action in order to protect the poor, the powerless, and 
the environment from a heedless Leviathan.223  From the point of view 
of Chief Justice Hughes’s decision in Morgan II, however, what 
Sunstein and Vermeule describe as a radical departure from the 1940s 
looks unexceptional: the imposition of novel yet somehow fundamental 
requirements of fairness, in keeping with the judicial temper of the 
day.  Similarly, the contemporary critics to whom both Sunstein and 
Vermeule and Ernst respond — the “Constitution in Exile” movement, 
the Tea Party — do not sound all that different than the lawyers who 
celebrated the imposition of new procedural requirements, new per-
sonnel, and a heightened standard of review on the NLRB in 1940, 
and 1946, and 1947, and 1951, all in the name of the same time-
honored traditions of “fair play” and “human liberty” that Chief Justice 
Hughes and John Lord O’Brian invoked in the 1930s (pp. 74, 98). 
History, then, may not be terribly helpful for those who wish to 
counter the arguments of today’s libertarian originalists.  Not only 
may their charges of administrative illegitimacy be immune to evi-
dence of decisions “We the People” made by social consensus or con-
gressional statute in the 1940s, but “We the People” have been marked-
ly skeptical about the legitimacy of administrative governance in the 
seventy-five years since the 1940s.  Of course, this skepticism has not 
stalled the growth of the administrative state.  Indeed, the simplest ex-
planation for the “recurrent sense of crisis” haunting the American 
administrative state may be found in its recurrent expansion.224  Yet 
this quantitative achievement has rarely been met with ready qualita-
tive acceptance.  Such a fundamental mismatch between administra-
tive growth and administrative legitimation may have a great deal to 
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do with the “rule of lawyers,” a regime that continually holds the ad-
ministrative state up to the judicial “image” (p. 76), even as it accepts 
in practice myriad deviations from the procedures of common law 
courts.   
Most American lawyers do not believe in the “Constitution in Ex-
ile.”  But Daniel Ernst’s rich history shows how they came to be 
haunted by what one might call the “Court in Exile.”  Under the gaze 
of this spectral Court, the administrative state must continue to incar-
nate “the spirit of the just judge” and its legalistic conception of “fair 
play” (p. 74), at the expense of alternative social and economic concep-
tions of fairness.  In the 1930s, some lawyers — and many other Amer-
icans — struggled to dispel such legalism once and for all.  The rheto-
ric of Tocqueville’s nightmare, however, proved powerful enough to 
install Dicey’s utopia in our collective dreams. 
